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The modeling and analysis of multilateral negotiations are studied under the assumption 
that reaching an agreement is the main objective of the negotiators. A new methodology and 
associated definitions are proposed to predict the outcomes of such negotiations. The general 
objective of the new methodology is to study movements from one state to another in 
multilateral negotiations, to predict stable agreements, and to study their properties. The 
assumptions that the set of possible agreements is discrete and specified in advance make the 
negotiation problems considered here distinctive. Each decision maker has two concerns: first, 
achieving an alternative that is as preferable as possible; second, building support for this 
alternative among the other decision makers. In summary, this research consists of a 
systematic investigation of multilateral negotiations with the following general characteristics: 
• Decision makers in the negotiation seek a resolution that is not only feasible but also 
stable (enduring). Of course, each negotiator tries to attain the most preferable 
agreement for himself or herself. 
• If an agreement is reached, it must be an alternative from a pre-specified list, and all of 
the decision makers must accept the agreement. 
• Decision makers can possess different levels of power (or legitimacy) in support of an 
agreement, so the negotiation is not necessarily symmetric. 
Moreover, the analysis makes use of the decision makers’ preference orders over the proposed 
alternatives only, and does not require cardinal representations of their preferences. 
New concepts including State, Acceptability, Feasibility, Stability, and Fallback Distance 
are defined to pave the way for the proposed methodology. It is based on four types of 
movements, from unstable states toward stable ones, including preferential improvement, 
agglomeration, disloyalty move, and strategic disimprovement. Some criteria and algorithms 
are proposed to measure the likelihood of different moves and different outcomes. An 
important theorem shows that all four types of movement are mutually exclusive. The 
evolution of a negotiation from its status quo to the most likely outcomes is illustrated, using a 
tree. Several applications demonstrate that the proposed methodology can be applied to 
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identify the most likely outcomes of a multilateral negotiation. Sensitivity analyses can be 
applied in several different ways to assess whether sudden or unforeseen changes in the model 
affect the conclusions.  
Several methods can be used from the literature for predicting the outcome of a 
negotiation. Social Choice Rules, Fallback Bargaining Procedures, and Bankruptcy Solutions 
are applied to the current negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea to predict or 
recommend the most appropriate resolution among the proposed alternatives. In addition, the 
applicability of Graph Model for Conflict Resolution and its associated decision support 
system (DSS), GMCR II, are briefly discussed. Reasons why these methods are not 
appropriate when reaching an agreement is the main objective of decision makers (DMs) are 
then put forward.  
Based on the conceptual model for multilateral negotiations proposed in this thesis, a 
practical Negotiation Support System (NSS) is designed and implemented in Microsoft Access 
using Microsoft Visual Basic. This NSS increases the speed and accuracy of calculations. In 
the output of this NSS, all movements from initial states to subsequent states and their 
associated likelihoods are clearly illustrated, and all stable agreements are distinguished.  
Two real-world multilateral negotiations, over the legal status of the Caspian Sea and over 
the Epton site brownfield redevelopment project in Kitchener, Ontario, Canada, are modeled 
and analyzed using the proposed methodology. To measure DMs’ weights quantitatively in the 
Caspian Sea negotiations, eleven criteria that can be considered to be important determinants 
of countries’ capabilities are discussed, evaluated, and integrated using a Multiple Criteria 
Decision Analysis model. The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method is employed to find 
the most favourable set of relative importance of different criteria for each country. Applying 
the proposed methodology indicates that unanimous agreements over the division of the 
Caspian Sea, either based on the International Law of the Seas or based on Soviet maps, are 
most likely as the enduring legal status of the Caspian Sea. 
The objective of applying the proposed methodology to actual negotiations over the 
redevelopment of a brownfield project is to ensure that the new methodology is flexible 
enough to model more real-world cases. Moreover, we wanted to test how well the actual 
outcomes of the real world negotiations match the most likely outcomes identified by the 
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methodology. The results show that the decisions on the use of the Epton site followed the 
most likely path described and predicted by the model. 
This thesis is multidisciplinary in nature. It utilizes different branches of knowledge, 
including applied mathematics (game theory), computer science and programming, 
international relations, and environmental management. However, negotiation modeling and 
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Negotiation is joint decision making in which divergent positions are ultimately combined 
under conditions of conflict and uncertainty, into a single outcome (Zartman and Rubin, 2003). 
Of course, negotiations may break down short of a resolution. Two or more individuals or 
groups are involved, and they make decisions and engage in exchange of information in order 
to determine a compromise, or perhaps a solution “outside the box”. Kersten (2002) defines 
negotiation as “a process of social interaction and communication that involves the distribution 
and redistribution of power, resources, and commitments.”  
 
1.1 Motivation 
During the past few decades, many approaches and models of the negotiation process have 
been proposed, based on different assumptions and principles, with different objectives. 
Nonetheless, there are only two fundamental approaches to the theory and practice of 
negotiation: 
• Positional negotiation, also called contentious or competitive negotiation; and  
• Integrative negotiation, also called cooperative problem solving or group decision making.  
Positional negotiation is often referred to as hard bargaining, while integrative negotiation 
is soft. Hard bargaining focuses on winning, avoids compromise, may include hidden agendas, 
and may result in one-sided agreements. In contrast, soft bargaining is adaptable, focuses on 
finding win/win solutions, encourages compromise, and sometimes creates innovative 
solutions (Fisher et al., 1991) 
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In general, this research falls within the first category, but seeks to integrate ideas from 
both. In this research, a new methodology is developed to model and analyze multilateral 
negotiations. Aiming to model negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea, the author 
was motivated to focus on the negotiations outside the competitive and cooperative 
approaches. Caspian Sea negotiations cannot be classified under a purely non-cooperative 
approach because decision makers in these negotiations are seeking a stable or enduring 
agreement whereas in a non-cooperative game, each player’s main concern is to select his or 
her own strategy which may include continued disagreement. A feasible resolution for the 
legal status of the Caspian Sea entails long-term cooperation. The countries around the 
Caspian Sea have been persuaded to cooperate with each other in order to resolve the 
increased pollution of the Caspian Sea, and environmental problems like overfishing and 
poaching. On the other hand, the Caspian Sea negotiations are not cooperative in the 
conventional sense since there is no compromise. In other words, unlike the bargaining 
problem in the cooperative approach we have a discrete space of negotiations and the ultimate 
agreement must be an alternative from a pre-specified list. Hence, the author developed new 
definitions and methodology to model and analyze negotiations in competitive situations, 
when reaching agreement is a crucial issue for decision makers. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
One can distinguish two classes of games, called non-cooperative and cooperative. In non-
cooperative games, all aspects of the players’ interactions are included in the model. When 
studying non-cooperative games, one often assumes that the players are unable to 
communicate, treating players isolated as individuals acting explicitly in their own interests. 
Of course, their interests may be conflicting or coincident, or a mixture of the two. In 
cooperative games, players can not only communicate but also have a reliable and costless 
enforcement mechanism, enabling them to make binding agreements. In cooperative games, 
the question is how the players compromise. In other words, how they should share the gains 
of the cooperation. In the real world, most human interactions are not at either extreme – they 
lie somewhere between non-cooperative and cooperative approaches.  
The methodology proposed in this thesis has some similarities with game-theoretic 
approaches conceptually, but differs from those approaches in some features. It is distinctive 
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from non-cooperative games as decision makers in our model look only for possible 
agreements. On the other hand, it is different from cooperative games because the outcome of 
negotiations is assumed to be selected from a pre-specified discrete set of alternatives. Another 
difference is that game theory is based on Neumann-Morgenstern utilities which are cardinal 
values, while in the methodology proposed in this thesis one needs to know only the ordinal 
preferences of decision makers over the proposed alternatives. 
New definitions and methodologies are proposed in this thesis to model and analyze 
multilateral negotiations with the following general characteristics: 
• Decision makers in the negotiation look for a feasible resolution, in other words, a stable or 
enduring agreement. Of course, each negotiator tries to attain the most preferable 
agreement for himself or herself. 
• If an agreement is reached, it must be one alternative from a pre-specified discrete list, 
which all decision makers must accept. 
• Decision makers can possess different levels of power (or legitimacy) in support of an 
agreement, so the negotiation is not necessarily symmetric. 
Moreover, only the preference order of each decision maker over the proposed alternatives is 
known for certain, so cardinal values cannot be assumed. 
One common classification of models is as normative, descriptive or prescriptive. However, 
this categorization is not exclusive, and one cannot necessarily ascribe a given model or 
methodology to only one category. The methodology proposed in this research is mostly 
descriptive in the sense that the most likely outcomes of a multilateral negotiation are 
identified. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, some of the most common 
negotiation models are introduced and applied to the continuing negotiations over the Caspian 
Sea. At the beginning of this Chapter, we review the history and geography of the Caspian Sea 
region and the history of multilateral negotiations over its legal status. Then, we briefly sketch 
the options for resolution for the legal status of the Caspian Sea, and discuss the five states’ 
preferences among the alternatives. Our primary aim is to describe the negotiations and predict 
what the outcome will be. Nonetheless, we use some normative methods; many of our 
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calculations are based on theories that assume that all bargainers act in their own best interests. 
In some sense, normative means doing what “should” be done, and what we do is similar to 
using game theory models to predict outcomes of conflicts. We discuss some selected social 
choice rules and apply them to find the “socially optimal” resolution. Subsequently, we review 
Fallback Bargaining and apply several versions of it to the negotiation scenario to predict the 
outcome of the bargaining. Next, we show how to represent the dispute in financial terms and 
apply several well-known fair division procedures called bankruptcy procedures. Finally, we 
discuss the limitations of the existing models including the Graph Model for Conflict 
Resolution. We explain why these models are not applicable when reaching an agreement is 
the main objective of decision Makers (DMs) in asymmetric multilateral negotiations. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to proposing a new methodology to model and analyze multilateral 
negotiations with a specific structure. The negotiation problems modeled in this chapter are 
distinctive because the set of possible agreements is discrete and specified in advance. Each 
DM has two concerns: first, achieving an alternative that is as preferable as possible to himself 
or herself; second, building support for this alternative among the other DMs. The main 
objective of this development is to formulate methodologies to predict the most likely 
outcomes of a particular form of multilateral negotiation, based on the capabilities of the DMs 
and their preferences over the available alternatives. In addition, we determine to what extent a 
state is likely to occur as the outcome of the negotiation. Some cases of sensitivity analysis are 
subsequently applied to assess whether sudden or unforeseen changes in the model do not 
affect the conclusions of stability analyses. 
In Chapter 4, we explain how our negotiation support system (NSS) is designed and 
implemented to represent the new conceptual definitions and run the proposed algorithms 
automatically. This Negotiation Support System is implemented in Microsoft Access using 
Microsoft Visual Basic. 
In Chapter 5, we apply the proposed methodology for modeling and analysis to the 
multilateral negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea. An investigation of the 
Caspian Sea negotiations is used to verify to what extent the proposed methodology can 
predict the observed outcomes of the negotiations. Then, we apply it to the ongoing 
negotiations to identify the most likely outcome of the continuing multilateral negotiations. 
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Chapter 6 concentrates on application of the proposed methodology to the modeling and 
analysis of actual negotiations over the redevelopment of the Epton site, a brownfield in 
Kitchener, Ontario. The objective is to ensure that the new methodology is flexible enough to 
model a range of real-world cases. The results show that the actual outcome of the negotiations 
over this redevelopment project matches the most likely outcome identified by the 
methodology. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a summary of the original contributions and 



































Existing Models for Multilateral Negotiations 
 
 
In this Chapter, we identify techniques for predicting the outcome of a negotiation and then 
apply them to the current negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea. The objective is 
to demonstrate how the existing models can be used for the analysis of real-world negotiations. 
Moreover, we want to illustrate the capabilities and limitations of these methodologies in 
modeling a relatively complex case. Subsequently, we explain why these models are not 
entirely satisfactory when reaching an agreement is the main objective of DMs in asymmetric 
multilateral negotiations. 
We discuss some social choice rules and review various versions of Fallback Bargaining, 
and then apply them to predict the outcome of the Caspian Sea negotiations. Then, we describe 
and apply bankruptcy procedures to find some fair divisions of the wealth of the Caspian Sea 
seabed. Finally, we discuss whether the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution can be applied 
for these purposes.  
 
2.1 The Caspian Sea Negotiations 
Since the existing models and the proposed methodology are applied to the Caspian Sea 
negotiations in this Chapter and in Chapter 5, respectively, a background of these negotiations 




2.1.1 Background of the Caspian Sea negotiations 
The Caspian Sea, which lies between the Caucasus Mountains and Central Asia, is considered 
by some to be the largest lake in the world. A salt-water body with an area of 376,000 km2, it 
is more than four times larger than Lake Superior (82,414 km2), the largest of the Great Lakes 
of North America. The Caspian Sea is the subject of one of the world’s most intractable 
disputes, involving five littoral states. Figure 2.1 shows the location of the Caspian Sea, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan as well as the adjacent parts of Russia and Iran. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Map of the Caspian Sea region. - Source: the US Government (2006).  
 
Perhaps one reason why the status of the Caspian Sea is so difficult to resolve is that the 
options are quite clearly specified and the disputants’ preferences well known. Simply put, the 
issue is who owns which part of the Caspian Sea, or whether the five littoral states share the 
entire sea in some sense. The main attraction is the existence of immense amounts of 
petroleum in the seabed. The proven and suspected reserves total 201 billion barrels of oil and 
about 570 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (British Petroleum, Statistical Review of World 
Energy, 2004). 
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One additional issue is related to pipeline transit opportunities, such as the planned BTC 
(Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) project, depicted in Figure 2.2, which will primarily benefit Georgia 
and Turkey, at a cost of US$3.6 billion. Another issue is geopolitical: Because it is a 
“crossroads” region, control of the Caspian Sea basin is important strategically, and both the 
USA and Russia have attempted to cooperate militarily with the newly independent states 
around the Caspian Sea (Kaliyeva, 2004). It was recently argued that the Caspian-Black-
Mediterranean axis could have great potential for force projection by the USA (Muresan, 
1998). 
 
Figure 2.2: Map of the Caspian Sea and surrounding regions showing the existing and 
proposed pipelines (Rabinowitz et al., 2004)  
 
Unfortunately, these issues will remain unresolved until the legal status of the Caspian Sea, 
which has been unclear since the collapse of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) in 1991, is settled. The consequences of this quagmire include increased pollution of 
the Caspian Sea, mainly by petroleum production and transportation; environmental 
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degradation, due to overfishing and poaching; and an atmosphere in which regional 
cooperation is difficult or impossible (Caspian Sea Region: Environmental Issues, 2003). 
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea was shared by the USSR and 
Iran, which enjoyed a stable relationship. Two USSR–Iran treaties governed the Caspian Sea, 
one that guaranteed free navigation to both parties and one that extended each state’s territorial 
waters 10 miles from the shoreline. Each state was granted exclusive fishing rights within its 
territorial waters under the latter treaty. 
After the collapse of the USSR at the end of 1991, there were five littoral states bordering 
the Caspian Sea: Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan. The legal status of 
the Caspian was immediately disputed, and no division of the waters or the seabed has been 
agreed upon to date. In addition to the important strategic issues associated with the stalemate, 
energy prices are rising and the consequences of having no agreement are mounting. The 
locations of the oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea are illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 - Oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea1    
Source: (Eurasia Net, 2001) 
1 Division in this map is based on equidistant median lines.  
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From 1992 to 2007, the five littoral states met on 26 occasions, at the presidential, 
ministerial and expert levels, in all five states and in many different cities. The last presidential 
meeting was held in October 2007 in Tehran; another meeting took place in Moscow in 
February 2006.  
 The following factors contribute to the continuing difficulty in resolving the disagreement 
over the legal status of the Caspian Sea and the division of its waters and its oil-rich seabed: 
• The number of disputants is relatively large, and their interests are quite different. 
• Many external parties have an interest in the region, including world powers like the 
USA and China, regional powers like Turkey, and oil industry multinational companies. 
• The ownership of the Caspian Sea is complicated by the fact that its geographical 
classification is ambiguous; international law does not clarify whether it is a lake or a sea. 
The main point of contention among the five littoral states is whether to apportion the sea 
or treat it as a whole. Some would prefer to divide it into discrete national segments while 
others would like to introduce a “condominium regime” under which the Caspian would be 
jointly owned, with no state having exclusive control over any part of it (Ahmadov, 2002). 
Iran and Russia, which possess other economic resources, generally favor the condominium 
principle; Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and to a lesser extent, Turkmenistan, favor exclusive 
economic zones, within which a state would be able to conduct operations without the consent 
of the others. These countries clearly anticipate that harvesting the rich resources of the 
Caspian seabed will be a great boon to their national development. However, they will have no 
control over any of the seabed resources until there is an agreement in place that accords each 
littoral state an exclusive economic zone. 
International law does not definitively settle the geographic status of the Caspian Sea 
(Witt, 2000). If the Caspian Sea is a lake, then under international rules condominium status 
should apply, and sovereignty should be jointly held. But the Caspian Sea cannot readily be 
classified as an “international lake.” First of all, its vast size and oceanographic characteristics 
are typical of seas rather than lakes. Second, and more importantly, the Caspian is now 
surrounded by a relatively large number of countries, which complicates matters. By contrast, 
the Great Lakes of North America are surrounded by only two countries, the USA and Canada, 
and the Gulf of Fonseca is bordered by only three, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. 
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The international rules regarding seas, particularly the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), could be applied to the Caspian if it were classified as a sea 
(Janusz, 2005). Full maritime boundaries of the five littoral states could then be established 
based on the median lines from the shores of the littoral states, using the principle of 
equidistance to divide the sea, and the undersea resources could be split into national sectors. 
This approach is referred to as “sectoral division.” 
The deadlock among the parties had solidified by 1997. Then Russia changed its priorities 
in an apparent effort to become more pragmatic and constructive. Rather than continuing to 
oppose the de facto alliance of Azerbaijan, Turkey, and the USA, Russia started to cooperate 
with all of the other littoral states by promoting mutually beneficial projects in the energy 
sphere. It further suggested that the two historical treaties with Iran (dating from 1921 and 
1941) were still valid. At the same time, despite the fact that division of the seabed was not 
mentioned in the existing treaties, it argued that the seabed should be divided among the five 
littoral states according to the modified median line method. Russia’s new negotiating strategy 
may reflect a desire for oil pipelines to be located on Russian soil. 
Iran initially rejected a division of the Caspian Sea based on the median line method, 
which would give it a share of only 13.6%. Feeling isolated in its stance and lacking the power 
to overcome the positions of the other states, it proposed two conditions for the division of the 
sea. In 2000, Khatami, the President of Iran at the time, demanded that Iran’s share be no less 
than 20% and that its sea surface and seabed areas be superjacent. 
Russia and Turkmenistan accepted Iran’s proposition at first, but Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan objected. Then Russia changed its position to advocate a dual purpose regime, in 
which division of the seabed and condominium status of the surface would produce a solution 
more acceptable to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Another proposal that was aired at this time 
was to divide the Caspian Sea based on Soviet-era maps. This system, based on the extension 
of the internal borders of five Soviet Republics, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, 
Dagestan, and Kalmykia, was developed by Moscow as an aid for administering Caspian Sea 
oil exploration projects after the Second World War (Maleki, 2001). 
Since five years ago, there have been some negotiating meetings among the officials of the 
five littoral countries, but there have not been any significant changes in their positions. This is 
the situation that we will attempt to model and analyze in Chapters 2 and 5. 
 12
 
2.1.2 The Options and the States’ Preferences  
The five coastal states – Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan – entered 
negotiations in 1993, but have not yet agreed upon who owns the waters or the oil and natural 
gas beneath them. Based on the history of the negotiations explained in Section 2.1.1, there are 
five ways to resolve the legal status of the Caspian Sea. We denote these alternatives as 
follows: 
C: Condominium status for both the surface and the seabed 
Dm: Division based on the International Law of the Seas 
De: Equal Division: 20% of the sea, and the seabed, to each littoral state 
Ds: Division based on Soviet maps 
DC: Division of the seabed based on the International Law of the Seas, with condominium 
status on the surface 
It is important to note that “Equal Division” does not result in equal shares in the revenue. 
Each state would receive 20% of the total surface (and seabed) of the Caspian Sea located 
adjacent to its shores. Since oil and gas resources are not uniformly distributed across the sea, 
the distribution of resources among states would be unequal. In contrast, the condominium 
alternative proposes that each state simply receive an equal share of the total revenue from 
joint exploitation of the resources. 
Based on assessments of their national economic, political, and military interests, and on 
their public statements, it is possible to infer that each state has strict preferences among the 
five alternatives. These preferences are indicated as follows (where “>” means “strictly 
prefers”):  
 
Azerbaijan       : s m eD D DC D C> > > >  
Iran   : e m sC D D DC D> > > >  
Kazakhstan     : s m eD D DC C D> > > >  
Russia   : s m eC DC D D D> > > >  
Turkmenistan: e s mD D D DC C> > > >  
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For convenience’s sake, a matrix will be used in which each state has a row listing the 
alternatives from most to least preferred. There are n = 5 rows and k = 5 columns.  
 






D D DC D C
C D D DC D
D D DC C D
C DC D D D












2.2 Social Choice Procedures 
Social choice theory is concerned with the principles underlying group choice by individuals who 
have different preferences among the available options [Roberts, 2006]. It deals with the principles 
of aggregation of preference in the sense that individual preference is to be reflected equitably in 
group preference insofar as possible. Social choice theory is applicable to decision-making by 
committees, voting, and many aspects of welfare economics. A social choice rule (SCR) selects a 
subset from a larger set of possibilities based on the configuration of individual preferences among 
the possibilities and other characteristics. We now discuss some common social choice rules and 
employ them to find the “socially optimal” legal status for the Caspian Sea.   
 
2.2.1 Condorcet Choice 
A Condorcet winner is an alternative that is at least as preferable as every other alternative for 
a majority of participants [Young, 1995]. For example, mD is preferred to C by Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, while C is preferred to Dm by Iran and Russia. Therefore, Dm 
is at least as preferable as C for a majority. Because we have assumed strict preferences, and 
since there is an odd number of participants (five), there must be a majority preference 
between any two alternatives. The entries in the table below show the winning alternative in 










Table 2.1:  Majority preference between all possible pairs of distinct alternatives 
 
Alternatives C mD  eD  sD  DC 
C - mD  C sD  DC 
mD  mD  - mD  sD  mD  
eD  C mD  - sD  DC 
sD  sD  sD  sD  - sD  
DC DC mD  DC sD  - 
 
It follows from Table 2.1 that sD is a Condorcet winner because it wins every comparison. 
Similarly, eD  is a Condorcet loser since it loses in pairwise comparison to every other 
alternative. In some social choice scenarios, there is no Condorcet winner, but there is one in 
this problem. 
As a kind of sensitivity analysis, we note that different solutions might arise if the 
preferences were slightly different. Suppose that we change the preference orders of 
Kazakhstan and Russia slightly but keep the preference orders of the other states the same. 
Specifically, if Kazakhstan and Russia were mostly concerned about the economic profit that 
could be obtained from exploitation of the Caspian Sea’s oil and gas resources and ignored 
their political and perhaps military interests, then we could consider the following preference 
orders for them (see Tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7): 
Kazakhstan: s m eD D DC D C> > > >  
Russia: e s mC DC D D D> > > >  
In contrast to the previous results displayed in Table 2.1, no Condorcet winner emerges under 
the new configuration of the states’ preferences. Also, alternative C (Condominium) becomes 
the Condorcet loser under the new conditions. 
 
2.2.2 Borda Scoring  
Another well-known social choice rule is the Borda Score [Young, 1995], which is defined for 
m alternatives as follows: assign score m – 1 to a participant’s most preferred alternative, score 
m – 2 to the participant’s second most preferred alternative, and in general score m – i to the 
participant’s ith most preferred alternative. (In other words, the score assigned by a DM to an 
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alternative is the number of other alternatives it is preferred to.) The Borda Score of an 
alternative is the sum of the scores assigned to it by all participants. The alternative(s) with the 
highest total score defines the choice set for the Borda social choice rule.  
 















C 4 4 0 0 1 9 
mD  2 1 2 3 3 11 
eD  3 0 4 1 0 8 
sD  0 2 3 4 4 13 
DC 1 3 1 2 2 9 
 
According to the Borda Score, sD is the best choice.   
 
2.2.3 The Plurality Rule 
The Plurality Rule is an old and rather simplistic way of making a social choice. It selects the 
alternative(s) considered best by the most voters (Merlin and Sanver, 2006). In other words, it 
assigns a score of 1 to a party’s most preferred alternative, 0 to all other alternatives, and 
selects the alternative(s) with the greatest total score. The method is most dependent on first-
choice support, disregarding any lower-level (or “lower-quality”) support. The total plurality 
scores of all the alternatives in our case study are as follows: 
 C = 2, sD  = 2, eD  = 1, DC = 0, mD  = 0 
Thus, the plurality SCR recommends either C or sD as the optimal legal status alternative for 
the Caspian Sea.   
 
2.2.4 Median Voting Rule and Majoritarian Compromise  
Another social choice rule is the Median Voting Rule (MVR) proposed by Bassett and Persky 
(1999). This rule picks all alternatives receiving majority support at the highest possible level. 
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Since there are five littoral states involved in the Caspian Sea negotiations, majority support 
means having the support of at least three states.  
A decision maker supports an alternative at the jth level if the alternative is in position j, or 
higher, in the DM’s preference order. In Table 2.3, level 1 is the highest possible level. Table 
2.3 shows that no alternative receives majority support at level 1, that alternative sD receives 
majority support at level 2, and that no other alternative receives majority support at that level. 
Hence, the Median Voting Rule picks sD  as the legal status of the Caspian Sea.   
 
 
Table 2.3:  The number of supporters for each alternative at each possible level of support 
Alternatives Support level 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 
C 2 2 2 3 5 
mD  0 2 4 5 5 
eD  1 2 2 3 5 
sD  2 3 4 4 5 
DC 0 1 3 5 5 
 
Like the Median Voting Rule, the Majoritarian Compromise (MC), which was introduced 
and developed by Sertel and Yilmaz (1999), picks alternatives receiving majority support at 
the highest possible level, but ties are broken according to the level of support received by the 
alternatives that are tied. Hence, Majoritarian Compromise is a refinement of Median Voting 
Rule, in the sense that the set of alternatives selected by Majoritarian Compromise is a subset 
of the set of alternatives chosen by the Median Voting Rule. Like the Median Voting Rule, the 
Majoritarian Compromise rule selects sD  as the legal status of the Caspian Sea. 
 
2.2.5 Condorcet’s Practical Method  
Condorcet’s Practical Method (CPM), described by Nurmi (1999), picks the alternative 
receiving a majority support at level 1, whenever it exists. If there is no alternative with 
majority support at this level, then the alternative(s) receiving the highest support at level 2 is 
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chosen. Table 2.3 shows that there is no alternative with majority support (at least three) at the 
first level but that a majority of states (3) support sD at level 2. Therefore, Condorcet’s 
Practical Method selects sD as the optimal legal status for the Caspian Sea. 
 
2.2.6 Conclusions 
In summary, all of the above-mentioned social choice procedures choose sD as the legal status 
of the Caspian Sea. Only the Plurality Rule is an exception, and then only in that it also 
recommends C in addition to sD as a possible legal status.  
We conclude that if one alternative must be selected, the choice of Ds is most likely to be 
consistent with the principles of social choice. However, we are not sure that this alternative is 
sustainable, because one state (Iran) ranks it last. Alternative C is worse, however, in the sense 
that two states (Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan) rank it as the least preferable resolution of the 
status of the Caspian Sea. 
 
2.3 Fallback Bargaining  
Fallback Bargaining (FB), introduced by Brams and Kilgour (2001), is an approach to 
bargaining that produces a prediction about the bargaining outcome. Bargainers are seen as 
beginning by insisting on their most preferred alternatives, then falling back, in lockstep, to 
less preferred alternatives until there is an alternative with sufficient support (i.e. majority or 
supermajority support, or unanimity, as appropriate). The outcome of Fallback Bargaining is a 
subset of alternatives called the Compromise Set (CS), which may be compared to the product 
of a social choice rule.  
Fallback Bargaining has many variants. Brams and Kilgour show that Unanimity Fallback 
Bargaining (UFB) leads to the alternative(s) receiving unanimous support at the highest 
possible level. In Unanimity Fallback Bargaining, the Compromise Set consists of exactly 
those alternatives that maximize the minimum satisfaction among all bargainers. In addition to 
Unanimity Fallback Bargaining, other variants are used below to predict the outcome of the 
Caspian Sea negotiations. If a decision rule other than unanimity is adopted, the outcome of 
Fallback Bargaining may be different from the UFB outcome. If preferences are strict, any 
Fallback Bargaining outcome is Pareto-optimal, but need not be unique; the UFB outcome is at 
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least middling in everybody’s ranking. Fallback Bargaining does not necessarily select a 
Condorcet alternative, or even the first choice of a majority of bargainers. However, it 
maximizes the satisfaction of the most dissatisfied bargainer. 
 
2.3.1 Unanimity Fallback Bargaining Procedure 
In Fallback Bargaining, the depth of agreement ( *d ) is the level of support at which a 
Compromise Set is acceptable. As shown below, the Unanimity Fallback Bargaining 
procedure recommends DC and mD as the legal status of the Caspian Sea, and the depth of 
agreement is 4.  
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2.3.2 q-Approval Fallback Bargaining 
For any fixed number of bargainers q, Brams and Kilgour (2001) define q-Approval Fallback 
Bargaining as the rule that picks the alternative(s) receiving the support of q parties at the 
highest possible level. Majoritarian Compromise and Unanimity Fallback Bargaining are 
particular cases of q-Approval Fallback Bargaining when q is equal to majority and unanimity, 
respectively. Moreover, q-Approval Fallback Bargaining coincides with the Plurality Rule 
when q = 1. 
Any alternative accepted by at least q bargainers is added to the Compromise Set qCS . If 
the legal status of the Caspian Sea could be determined by a majority (at least 3) bargainers, 
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Simple Majority Fallback Bargaining arises from setting ( 1) 5 1 32 2
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which in this example produces 
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If q = 3, the Depth of Agreement ( *3d ) is 2. The 3-Approval Compromise Set (
3CS ) comprises 
exactly the outcome that maximizes the minimum satisfaction of the three most satisfied 
bargainers, which in this case are the three newly-independent countries, consisting of 
Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.  
 
2.3.3 Fallback Bargaining with Impasse 
Brams and Kilgour (2001) also supposed that additional data might be available whereby 
bargainers could make use of an “impasse” in their rankings, indicating an outcome below 
which they would prefer no agreement. The impasse itself could then become the fallback 
outcome, foreclosing any agreement. Each bargainer’s impasse (walk-away) level is indicated 
by “I” in his or her preference ranking. We developed these additional data as follows:  
• Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have proclaimed their disagreement with the Condominium 
approach and equal division of the Caspian Sea. Therefore, these two countries might 
prefer no agreement to alternatives C and eD . 
• Iran has insisted that the system of division should yield Iran a share of not less than 












division of the seabed. Therefore, Iran might prefer no agreement to 
alternatives mD , DC  and sD . 
Since Russia and Turkmenistan want an agreement, we insert I at the end of their rankings. 
The following shows the bargainers’ preferences among the alternatives when they are allowed 
to indicate “impasse” in their rankings: 
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This calculation means that no alternative maximizes the minimum satisfaction of all 
bargainers in the case of an impasse. This result explains why the parties have not yet reached 
a unanimous agreement regarding the legal status of the Caspian Sea. But 4-Approval Fallback 
bargaining with impasse yields a solution: alternative sD maximizes the minimum satisfaction 
of all bargainers, with the exception of Iran. 
 











e s m s
s m e
s m e
C D I D DC D
C DC D D D I
D D D DC C I CS I D
D D DC I D C
D D DC I C D
 
 




Several variants of the Fallback Bargaining method are applied in this section to predict the 
bargaining outcome of the Caspian Sea negotiations. Different variants in some cases lead to 
different solutions. However, the predictions of the Unanimity Fallback Bargaining Procedure 
must be given special weight in light of the fact that the five presidents of the Caspian Sea 












which they agreed that the legal regime of the Caspian Sea should be determined unanimously. 
(“The sides believe that the Caspian Sea legal regime convention is authorized to determine 
the Caspian Sea legal regime, which can only be approved through the littoral states’ 
consensus.”) The Unanimity Fallback Bargaining Procedure recommends two compromise 
alternatives: DC and mD . Although for both of these alternatives a unanimous agreement 
among all of the bargainers occurs at the fourth level (depth) of agreement, mD has a higher 
Borda Score than DC (11 versus 9). Hence, mD  might be an appropriate resolution for 
recommendation. At least we can say that if the division schema based on the International 
Law of the Seas is adopted as the legal status of the Caspian Sea, the intensity of conflicts and 
controversial disputes would probably be minimized. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that 








 “Consider a situation in which a man dies and his estate is insufficient to meet 
his debts. The bankruptcy problem deals with the following question: how to 
divide the estate among all creditors. The natural approach to this problem 
would be to look for allocation rules that satisfy some desired properties.” 
(Dagan and Volji, 1993) 
 
At present, the Caspian Sea’s claimants (the five states) seem to be following a cooperative 
rather than a competitive approach. Now the problem is to determine a fair resource allocation 
plan. The total value of the oil and natural gas located in the seabed of the Caspian Sea is not 
sufficient to provide Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan with all of the 
revenue they claim.  
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Bankruptcy procedures, which are related to cooperative game theory concepts, are 
suitable for fair division problems in which the total amount of the asset is not sufficient to 
cover all creditors’ claims. We will use some bankruptcy procedures to determine each state’s 
fair share of the wealth generated from the Caspian Sea region. 
 
2.4.2 The Value of Creditors’ Claims 
First, we calculate the value of the oil and natural gas claimed by each regional state. The 
information contained in Table 2.4 is associated with Figure 1.3. 
 
 
Table 2.4: Caspian Sea region’s oil and natural gas reserves based on the International Law  






















Azerbaijan 7 32 39 48 35 83 
Iran b  0.1 15 15.1 0 11 11 
Kazakhstan 9 92 101 65 88 153 
Russia b  1 7 8 N/A N/A 65 
Turkmenistan 0.5 38 38.5 101 159 260 
  
b Only regions near the Caspian Sea are included. 
Source: BP. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2004.  
 
We suppose that the natural gas price in the region is approximately US$6 per thousand 
cubic feet since the price of natural gas supplied to the Ukraine by Gazprom (Russia’s national 
gas company) in January 2006 is equivalent to US$230 per thousand cubic meters and a cubic 
meter is approximately 35.3 cubic feet. In addition, the average price of natural gas imported 





Table 2.5:  The value of oil and natural gas reserves based on the International Law of the Seas 
























Azerbaijan 39 50 1950 83 6 498 2448 
Iran b  15.1 50 755 11 6 66 821 
Kazakhstan 101 50 5050 153 6 918 5968 
Russia b  8 50 400 65 6 390 790 
Turkmenistan 38.5 50 1925 260 6 1560 3485 
Sum 201.6 50 10080 572 6 3432 13512 
 
The results of Table 2.5 would be valid even if the legal status of the Caspian Sea were 
considered to be condominium on surface and division of the seabed (DC) because only the oil 
and natural gas located within each state’s seabed sector (based on the International Law of the 
Seas) are considered as valuable assets.  
If the legal status of the Caspian Sea were considered to be totally condominium, all five 
states would possess an equal share of the oil and natural gas in the seabed. Therefore, 40.32 
billion barrels of oil and 114.4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas would be allocated to each 
regional state. Table 2.6 shows these values for each state. 
 


























Azerbaijan 40.32 50 2016 114.4 6 686.4 2702 
Iran 40.32 50 2016 114.4 6 686.4 2702 
Kazakhstan 40.32 50 2016 114.4 6 686.4 2702 
Russia 40.32 50 2016 114.4 6 686.4 2702 
Turkmenistan 40.32 50 2016 114.4 6 686.4 2702 
Sum 201.6 50 10080 572 6 3432 13512 
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For example, the division of the Caspian Sea based on Soviet maps ( sD ) is most preferable 
for Azerbaijan since it would receive 22.4 percent of the Sea, versus only 21 percent based on 
the International Law of the Seas ( mD ). We do not have access to the precise amount of the oil 
and natural gas that is located in Azerbaijan’s territory based on the division referring to the 
Soviet maps, so we extrapolated those data based on the information in Tables 2.5 and 2.7, and 
Figure 2.3.   
 
 
Table 2.7:  Percentage shares allocated to each country based on the type of division 
 
Country Based on 
International Law of 
the Seas ( mD ) 
Equal division 
( eD ) 
Referring to 
Soviet maps 
 ( sD ) 
Azerbaijan 21% 20% 22.4% 
Iran 13.6 20 11 
Kazakhstan 28.4 20 28.4 
Russia 19 20 19 
Turkmenistan 18 20 19.2 
 
 
The amount of oil in Azerbaijan’s territory according to the division of the Caspian Sea 
based on Soviet maps is estimated to be 41.19 billion barrels. This approximation is founded 
on the assumption that the extra 1.4 percent of the Sea allocated to Azerbaijan based on 
sD compared with mD  is transferred from Iran and is calculated as: 





 billion barrels. 
Likewise, the approximate amount of natural gas located in Azerbaijan’s territory based on sD  
is 86.8 trillion cubic feet. 





 Trillions of cubic feet 
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Equal division of the Caspian Sea ( eD ) is the best alternative for Turkmenistan because 
this arrangement would yield Turkmenistan 2.0 percent more than the International Law of the 
Seas ( mD ). We assume that this amount would be taken in equal parts from Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan’s approximate resource levels under eD would be 43.8 billion 
barrels of oil and 274.72 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. 
We mentioned the preferences of the five littoral states in the previous sections. To apply 
bankruptcy procedures, we suppose that the claim of each of these states is equal to the 
greatest amount that it would receive under any alternative. 
 
Table 2.8: The amount of oil and natural gas claimed by regional states 
 








Azerbaijan sD  41.19 86.8 
Iran C 40.32 114.4 
Kazakhstan sD  101 153 
Russia C 40.32 114.4 






























Azerbaijan 41.19 50 2059.5 86.8 6 520.8 2580 
Iran 40.32 50 2016 114.4 6 686.4 2702 
Kazakhstan 101 50 5050 153 6 918 5968 
Russia 40.32 50 2016 114.4 6 686.4 2702 
Turkmenistan 43.8 50 2190 274.72 6 1648.32 3838 
Sum 266.63 50 13331.5 743.32 6 4459.9 17791 
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The total value of oil and natural gas claimed by the five littoral states is US$17791 billion, 
which is approximately 32% more than the total value of proven and possible oil and gas 
located in the seabed of the Caspian Sea ($13512 billion). 
 
2.4.3 Basic Concepts and Definitions 








≤ ≤∑ . E represents 
the total value of the estate, and c is the vector of the creditors’ claims. The sum of these 
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=∑  and 0 i ix c≤ ≤ ,  i = l,..., n. 
Denoting A: Azerbaijan; I: Iran; K: Kazakhstan; R: Russia; and T: Turkmenistan, we write c, 
the vector of creditors’ claims, as follows: 
( , , , , ) (2580,2702,5968,2702,3838)= =A I K R Tc c c c c c  
 Then 0 < E =13512 < C = 17791. 
 
2.4.4 Bankruptcy Rules for Resource Allocation 
Now, we allocate the value of the oil and natural gas in the Caspian Sea to the claimant states. 
Note that the objective is different from Sections 2.2 and 2.3, where we sought a resolution: 
we now assume that an allocation can be implemented by transferring money from state to 
state in accordance with the allocation. An allocation rule is a function that assigns a unique 
allocation to each bankruptcy problem.  
 
 (a) The proportional rule is defined as follows: 
Pr ( , )g E c cλ= , where λ C = E. 
The proportional rule allocates awards in proportion to the claims. The proportionality 
principle was favored by the philosophers of ancient Greece; Aristotle even considered it 
synonymous with justice. The proportional rule is widely used nowadays. 
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λ⇒ = = =  
Pr ( , )g E c cλ= (1960,2052,4533,2052,2915)=  
The proportional rule proposes an allocation of $1960, $2052, $4533, $2052, and $2915 
billion for Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan, respectively. 
 
(b) The constrained equal award (CEA) rule is defined as follows: 





This rule assigns the same sum to all creditors, except that no creditor receives more than his 
or her claim. In other words, it divides the estate equally among the creditors, constrained by 
their claims. 
Note 1 - For each well-defined bankruptcy problem, the set of its allocations is non-empty. 
Note 2 - The equation has a unique solution when C > E. If C = E, any solution λ  is greater 
than or equal to the maximum claim and, therefore, i ix c=  for all i. 
Among the Caspian Sea’s creditors, Azerbaijan has the smallest claim, 2580Ac = .  So, we 
equally allocate $2580 billion to all of the claimants in the first stage. In this case, Azerbaijan 
would be satisfied by this stage.  
5*2580 = $12900 billion is assigned in the first stage of allocation to all of the creditors. 
13512 - 12900 = $612 billion = remainder for other allocations. 
After Azerbaijan, Iran and Russia have the least amount of claims and request only 122 extra 
billion Dollars to be satisfied. (2702 – 2580 = 122) 
In the second stage of allocation, we equally add this 122 billion dollars to the rest of the 
claimants.  
4*122 = $488 billion is assigned in the second stage of allocation. Hence, Azerbaijan, Iran and 
Russia have been satisfied so far. 
612 – 488 = $124 billion = reminder for the third allocation 
Although there is 124 billion dollars available for the next stage of allocation, it is not 
possible to satisfy another claimant since Turkmenistan requests 1136 extra billion dollars 
(3838 – 2702) to be satisfied and there is not 2*1136 extra billion dollars to be divided equally 
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among two claimants. Hence, we can add half of the remaining money (62 billion$) to both 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan’s shares. This means that 2702 62 2764λ = + =  
 ( , )CEAg E c x=  = (2580, 2702, 2764, 2702, 2764) 
 
The process of resource allocation based on the constrained equal award (CEA) rule is 
illustrated in Figure 2.4. As the graph shows, Azerbaijan, Iran and Russia can achieve the 
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Figure 2.4 - The process of resource allocation based on the constrained equal award (CEA) 
rule 
 
Another rule, defined only for two-creditor problems, is the contested garment principle, 
which is defined as follows: 
1 2 2 1
1 2( , ( , )) ( , ).2 2
E E E E
CG E c c E c cg E c c + − + −=   where { }min ,Ei ic c E= . 




As a legal concept, Eic may be interpreted as that part of E claimed by creditor i. He cannot 
claim more than is there and, thus Eic can be interpreted as the relevant claim given E. This rule 
cannot be applied for the Case of Caspian See because there are more than two creditors in 
Caspian See negotiations. In order to define the next rule, we need the following definition: 








The symbol ( , )E ciν is the amount of money conceded to creditor i by all other creditors. 
Whenever there is no danger of confusion we write simply iν instead of 
( , )E c
iν . It can be shown 
that if x is an allocation, then i ixν ≤ , which means that iν is the minimum amount of money 
that may be assigned to i by any allocation rule. 
 
(c) The adjusted proportional (AP) rule is defined as follows: ( , )APg E c x=  where 
1( )( ( )) ( )E Ei i i i j j j
j N j N
x v c c v E vν −
∈ ∈
= + − − −∑ ∑   , if C > E > 0  








The APg can be interpreted as allocating E in two stages. In the first stage, each creditor i 




−∑ for the next stage. In the second 
stage, APg divides the remainder in proportion to the outstanding claims.  
For the case of Caspian Sea, Ei ic c=  for all of the claimants since  







∑  . 
{ } { }(13512, ) max 0;13512 ( ) max 0;(13512 15211) 0cA I K R Tc c c cν⇒ = − + + + = − =  
{ } { }(13512, ) max 0;13512 ( ) max 0;(13512 15089) 0cI A K R Tc c c cν⇒ = − + + + = − =  
{ } { }(13512, ) max 0;13512 ( ) max 0;(13512 11823) 1689cK A I R Tc c c cν⇒ = − + + + = − =  
{ } { }(13512, ) max 0;13512 ( ) max 0;(13512 15089) 0cR A I K Tc c c cν⇒ = − + + + = − =  
{ } { }(13512, ) max 0;13512 ( ) max 0;(13512 13953) 0cT A I K Rc c c cν⇒ = − + + + = − =  
1( )( ( )) ( )E Ei i i i j j j
j N j N
x v c c v E vν −
∈ ∈
= + − − −∑ ∑  
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c v − − −
∈
− = + + − + + = =∑




− = − + + + + =∑  
1 5( ( )) ( ) 6.2107*10 *11823 0.7343Ej j j
j N j N
c v E v− −
∈ ∈
− − = =∑ ∑  
1( )( ( )) ( )E Ei i i i j j j
j N j N
x v c c v E vν −
∈ ∈
= + − − −∑ ∑  
( )(0.7343) 0 (2580 0)(0.7343) 1895A A A Ax cν ν⇒ = + − = + − =
( )(0.7343) 0 (2702 0)(0.7343) 1984I I I Ix cν ν⇒ = + − = + − =  
( )(0.7343) 1689 (5968 1689)(0.7343) 4831K K K Kx cν ν⇒ = + − = + − =
( )(0.7343) 0 (2702 0)(0.7343) 1984R R R Rx cν ν⇒ = + − = + − =  
( )(0.7343) 0 (3838 0)(0.7343) 2818T T T Tx cν ν⇒ = + − = + − =  
( , ) (1895,1984,4831,1984,2818)APg E c x= = . 
 
2.4.5 Comparison of Bankruptcy Allocations 
The allocations resulting from the application of the three bankruptcy procedures to the oil and 
gas resources of the Caspian Sea are summarized in Table 2.10. 
 
Table 2.10: The results of assignment based on different rules of resource allocations 










Azerbaijan  1960 2580 1895 
Iran  2052 2702 1984 
Kazakhstan 4533 2764 4831 
Russia 2052 2702 1984 
Turkmenistan 2915 2764 2818 




We now discuss how resource allocation rules could be implemented. For example, 
suppose that mD (division based on the International Law of the Seas) has been determined to 
be an appropriate or convenient regime, but that the claimants agree to implement the 
constrained equal award rule. Based on mD , each state is to extract the oil and natural gas 
located in its exclusive territory; it then receives or pays some compensation. Table 2.10 
illustrates that Azerbaijan would receive $2580 billion according to the constrained equal 
award rule, although the value of the oil and natural gas reserves located in the Azerbaijan 
sector (based on mD ) is only $2448 billion (see Table 2.5). Azerbaijan would, therefore, 
receive an additional $132 billion in compensation. On the other hand, other states would be 
obligated to pay into the compensation pool. For instance, Turkmenistan would pay $721 
billion as compensation because the oil and natural gas reserves located in the Turkmenistan 
sector (based on mD ) are worth $3485 billion, but only $2764 billion is to be assigned to 
Turkmenistan according to the constrained equal award rule.  
Table 2.10 shows that applying different rules leads to different allocations. Hence, the 




Table 2.11: The preferences of the regional states  
among the different rules of resource allocations 
Regional States 
The most desirable rule The second most 
desirable rule 
The least desirable rule 
Azerbaijan  b a c 
Iran  b a c 
Kazakhstan c a b 
Russia b a c 
Turkmenistan a c b 
 
 
We now apply social choice rules and Fallback Bargaining procedures to select the most 
appropriate allocation rule. As indicated in Table 2.12, all of the social choice rules discussed 
here select rule (b), the constrained equal award rule, although the Borda SCR also chooses 
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(a) in addition to (b). Rule (a), the proportional rule, is also selected by the Unanimity 
Fallback Bargaining procedure. 
 
Table 2.12:  The selected rule based on social choice and Fallback Bargaining procedures 
Social choice and Fallback Bargaining procedures The selected rule
Condorcet winner – Plurality – MC – MVR – CPM b 
Borda Score a – b 
Unanimity Fallback Bargaining Procedure a 
 
 
2.4.6 Bankruptcy Allocations: Conclusions 
The constrained equal award rule is socially optimal according to all of the applied social 
choice rules. However, resource allocation based on the proportional rule maximizes the 
minimum satisfaction across all five states; the Unanimity Fallback Bargaining procedure 
selects this rule. In other words, the proportional rule would probably be easier to implement 
since none of the states strongly objects to it. 
 
 
2.5 The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution 
The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (Fang, Hipel, and Kilgour, 1993) is a methodology 
to model and analyse DMs’ interactions in a conflict in order to find states stable for all of the 
decision makers, which are interpreted as feasible resolutions of the conflict. The Graph 
Model, which constitutes an extension of conflict analysis (Fraser and Hipel, 1984), which in 
turn is an improvement over metagame theory (Howard, 1971), utilizes concepts and 
definitions from graph theory, set theory, and game theory.  
In a graph model, a state is a potential outcome of the conflict, or scenario. Each DM’s 
possible moves from one state to another are illustrated using a directed graph in which nodes 
represent states and arcs indicate the state-to-state transitions controlled by the DM. A graph 
model for a conflict consists of a collection of directed graphs. The Graph Model can handle 
both transitive and intransitive preferences. However, in most real life conflicts DMs’ 
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preferences can be assumed to be transitive and thus expressed as a ranking (ordering) of the 
states from most to least preferred, where ties are allowed.  
The systematic procedure for applying the Graph Model follows the two main stages 
modeling and analysis. In the modeling stage, the problem is structured by determining the 
DMs, the states, the possible state transitions controlled by each DM, and each DM’s relative 
preferences over the states. Next, in the analysis stage, the stability of each state from each 
DM’s viewpoint is determined. The objective is to find stable states. 
 The essential parts of a Graph Model in option form are the DMs and the options or 
courses of action available to each DM. In general, a DM may exercise any combination of the 
options he or she controls. When every DM has selected a set of options, a state is defined. Of 
course, there may be restrictions on the option choices or changes of options available to a 
DM. When these are specified, the feasible states, which constitute the actual set of realizable 
states in the model, and allowable transitions, can be easily determined.  
Often there are logical reasons why a particular combination of options does not represent 
a feasible state. If so, the combination is removed since it cannot form a feasible state. The 
followings are the most common types of infeasibility: 
• Among some options, at least one must be taken. 
• Among some options, at most one can be taken (mutually exclusive). For instance, 
either option A or option B can be chosen, possibly neither, but not both.  
• An option’s availability depends on the selection of another option. For example, 
option A can be selected only if option B is chosen.  
• An option must be taken when another option is selected. For example, A must be 
taken when B is taken. 
The state-to-state transitions controlled by a DM are exactly those implied by a unilateral 
change of the DM’s option selection. These steps produce the usual set of directed graphs, and 
the graph model is completed by each DM’s relative preferences among the feasible states. 
Since each DM’s graph has the same set of nodes; it is often useful to show all DMs’ graphs 
on the same diagram by simply integrating them and labelling each arc to indicate the DM 
who controls it. Such a graph is called the integrated graph of the model.  
In a Graph Model, the set of all states that DM i can unilaterally reach from state s in one 
step is the reachable list (R). A unilateral improvement (UI) from a particular state for a 
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specific DM is a preferred state (for that DM) to which he or she can unilaterally move in one 
step. It follows that R can be partitioned into two subsets: the set of unilateral improvements 
from state s for DM i; and the set of unilateral disimprovements from state s for DM i. 
The associated decision support system GMCR II (Fang et al. 2003 a, b) conveniently 
implements the graph model for conflict resolution. It incorporates the option form for conflict 
modeling, and determines the stability of every state for each DM under a broad range of 
stability types. GMCR II is generally able to produce a variety of equilibrium information 
which enhances the analyst’s understanding of the conflict and results in useful advice to 
specific DMs on whether possible outcomes are strategically stable. 
The stability of states for DMs is defined by various solution concepts, or stability 
definitions. Nash stability (Nash, 1950, 1951) reflects a DM who thinks only one step ahead. 
In general metarationality (GMR) (Howard, 1971) and sequential stability (SEQ) (Fraser and 
Hipel, 1984), a DM considers exactly two steps ahead; whereas in symmetric metarationality 
(SMR) (Howard, 1971), the DM takes into account three steps by assessing available escapes 
from any sanctions that may be imposed by the opponents. A disimprovement is a move to a 
less preferred state in order to reach a more preferred state eventually, or to block unilateral 
improvements of other DMs. In Nash and sequential stability, disimprovements are never 
permitted, while in general and symmetric metarationality disimprovements by the opponents 
for the purpose of sanctioning are allowed. The Graph Model also provides other, more 
sophisticated stability definitions, which are also implemented in GMCR II. 
Since different solution concepts may be appropriate for different DMs, states that are 
stable under many solution concepts are usually preferred. Thus, it is important to consider 
more than one kind of solution concept for each DM to ensure a robust prediction of the 
conflict resolution. 
 
2.6 Limitations of the Existing Models 
We now describe why the models explained in this Chapter are not entirely satisfactory when 
reaching agreement is the main objective of DMs in asymmetric multilateral negotiations. 
Social choice rules are not comprehensive enough to describe and analyze multilateral 
negotiations such as Caspian Sea negotiations. Social choice theory deals with the principles 
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of preference aggregation in the sense that individual preference is to be reflected equitably in 
group preference. It is mostly applicable to democratic decision-making by committees or 
electorates while, in real-world multilateral negotiations, DMs possess different levels of 
power or legitimacy. In addition, DMs’ first concerns are their own preferences.  
Like social choice theory, fallback bargaining procedures have some limitations. Fallback 
bargaining methods may describe two-person negotiations well, but are not easily generalized 
to multilateral negotiations. Moreover, fallback bargaining assigns equal weight to all decision 
makers.  
Bankruptcy solutions apply to resource allocation problems but they are natural only in a 
Transferable Utility context, since they determine how to allocate a fixed amount of money, 
usually. In a Transferable Utility (TU) game, players can freely transfer utility to other players. 
Approaches suitable for TU games cannot be applied when there are issues for which utility is 
not transferable. 
Solution concepts of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution are not applicable in 
multilateral negotiations when reaching an agreement is a main objective of DMs. In the 
Graph Model for conflict resolution, options are actions that might be carried out by the DMs, 
while in multilateral negotiations, like the Caspian Sea model, the DMs do not carry out 
actions but support, or not, a specific alternative as the outcome of the negotiation. In the 
Graph model, the basic objective is to identify stability rather than to follow a possible 
evolution. In the Graph model, reaching agreement is not the essential objective. 
 
2.7 Summary 
This Chapter introduces several existing models for predicting the outcome of a negotiation. 
Social Choice Rules, Fallback Bargaining Procedures, and Bankruptcy Solutions are applied to 
the current negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea to predict or recommend the 
most appropriate resolution among the proposed alternatives. In addition, the Graph Model for 
Conflict Resolution and its associated DSS GMCR II are briefly discussed, but not applied. 
Then, reasons why the existing models are not appropriate when reaching an agreement is the 
main objective of DMs in asymmetric multilateral negotiations are put forward. To resolve the 








Proposed Methodology for Modeling Multilateral 
Negotiations 
 
The negotiation problems modeled in this chapter are distinctive because the set of possible 
agreements is discrete and specified in advance. Each decision maker has two concerns: first, 
achieving an alternative that is as preferable as possible to himself or herself; second, building 
support for this alternative among the other decision makers. New definitions and 
methodologies are proposed in this chapter to model and analyze multilateral negotiations. The 
main objective of this research is to formulate methodologies to predict the most likely 
outcomes of a particular form of multilateral negotiation, based on the capabilities of the 
decision makers and their preferences over the available alternatives. The methodology 
proposed in this chapter analyzes multilateral negotiations with the following general 
characteristics: 
• Decision makers in the negotiation look for a feasible resolution, in other words, a 
stable or enduring agreement. Of course, each negotiator tries to attain the most 
preferable agreement for himself or herself. 
• If an agreement is reached, it must be an alternative from a prespecified list, which 
all decision makers must accept. 
• Decision makers can possess different levels of capability (power or legitimacy) in 
support of an agreement, so the negotiation is not necessarily symmetric. 
• The analysis makes use of only the preference order of each decision maker over the 
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proposed alternatives, and does not require cardinal measures of preference. 
 
 3.1 Definitions 
We now propose new definitions which will be applied in the proposed methodology, to 
identify the likely agreements and specify their likelihoods. Suppose that { }1,2,3,...,N n=  is 
the set of all decision makers (DMs) in the negotiation, and { }1 2, ,..., qA a a a= is the set of all 
alternative agreements. We assume 2n ≥ and 2q ≥ . 
  
Definition1: DMs’ Preference Rankings over Agreements 
For i N∈ , i  is DM i’s weak preference relation on A. Thus, k i ja a  means i prefers ka  to 
ja  or is indifferent between ka and ja . The relation i  is assumed to be reflexive and complete. 
Strict preference for DM i is the relation i  , defined on A by k i ja a  iff k i ja a  and 
¬ ( )j i ka a , where ¬ means negation. For i N∈ , i∼  is DM i’s  indifference relation on A; 
j i ka a∼  iff k i ja a  and j i ka a . Preferences are usually transitive but not always, and the 
methodology developed herein can be used even when preferences are intransitive. 
We define { }( ) 1 :i j i jP a a A a a= + ∈ to indicate the preference of DM i over the 
alternative ja . For example 2 ( ) 1P B = means that alternative B is the best alternative according to 
DM 2. Likewise, 3 3( ) ( ) 4P A P D= =  indicates that DM 3 is indifferent between alternatives A and 
D and considers these alternatives as his or her fourth preference. 
 
Definition 2: Acceptability 
Each DM may be willing to accept only some of the proposed alternatives as the outcome 
of the negotiation. For each decision maker, acceptability is denoted by a positive integer. DM 
i will accept alternative ja  if and only if ( )i jP a ≤ iAcc  . 
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Definition 3: Negotiation State 
A negotiation state consists of an alternative and a non-empty subset of DMs who support 
that alternative as the outcome of the negotiation. Thus, ( , )ja C  denotes a negotiation state 
where ja A∈  and ,C N C⊆ ≠ ∅ . The set of all possible states is (2 )NS A= × −∅ . Note that 
.(2 1)nS q= − .  
 
Definition 4: Feasibility 
An agreement can be implemented if and only if the supporting coalition is strong enough. 
Hence, a negotiation state is feasible if the coalition defined by the state is strong enough to 
enforce the agreement defined by the state. To reflect that the power or legitimacy of different 
DMs may be different in real-world negotiations, we denote by iw  the weight of DM i in the 
negotiation. If the sum of coalition members’ weights is at least equal to a threshold, T, then 
the negotiation state is feasible. Thus, the threshold is the least total weight of a coalition that 
is strong enough to enforce an agreement. Of course, this parameter must be determined before 
state feasibility can be assessed. 
In summary, we assign a weight iw > 0 to each i N∈ , and, for each ja A∈ , a threshold 




≥∑  The threshold may depend on 
the alternative when different alternatives require different levels of support to be feasible. If 







The specification of weights is a major issue when this methodology is applied. However, veto 
power can be consistent with this methodology. If we want to generalize the concept of 
feasibility in the negotiations in which some DMs possess veto power, then the threshold must 
be at least equal to sum of the veto players’ weights. 
 
Definition 5: Stability 
A negotiation state from which there is no movement is called stable. Different types of 
movements are defined in the next section. 
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Definition 6: Fallback Distance 
iFD  is a non-negative integer parameter describing DM i. In strategic disimprovements (see 
below), i is willing to accept ka  rather than ja , even though k i ja a≺ , if ( ) ( )i k i j iP a P a FD− ≤  . 
This parameter indicates the level that DM i is willing to retreat to a less preferred alternative 
to achieve an agreement.  
 
Some members of the coalition associated with a negotiation state may prefer another state, 
feasible or infeasible. We now define several possible movements from one state to another. 
 
3.2 Methodology 
The proposed methodology is based on the analysis of stable states. To determine the stable 
states, we must describe the different possible movements. Members of the coalition of a 
negotiation state might move to another state for the following reasons: 
• The members of the coalition find another alternative more preferable. 
• One or more extra DMs join the coalition because they support the agreement that the 
coalition is enforcing.  
• One or more members of a coalition may form another coalition (on their own or along 
with other DMs) to support another agreement. 
• One or more members of a coalition may join another coalition supporting an 
agreement that is less preferable to the members who move. This strategic 
disimprovement must be a move from an infeasible state to a feasible one.  
The third type of movement is called disloyalty, to capture the idea that some members of 
the initial coalition leave their “friends” in that coalition to form another coalition in order to 
support another agreement. 
 
3.2.1 Mathematical definitions of movements 
If there is a movement from ( , )ja C to( , )ka C′ , we call ( , )ja C the initial or status quo state and 
( , )ka C′  the subsequent state. Now, we propose mathematical definitions of these movements. 
 40
 
1) Preferential Improvement: 
A preferential improvement is a change of state ( , ) ( , ),j ka C a C→  where k i ja a  for all i C∈  
and for some i C∈  , k i ja a  . If there is another agreement preferred by all members of a 
given coalition, then there is a preferential improvement. 
 
2) Agglomeration:  
An agglomeration is a change of state ( , ) ( , ),j ja C a C′→   where C C′⊂  . In this case, ja  is 
acceptable for all ( )i C C′∈ − . 
 
3) Disloyalty: 
A disloyalty move is a change of state ( , ) ( , ),j ka C a D→ when , ,j k C D C D≠ ≠ ≠ ∅∩ , 
( , )ka D  is feasible, k i ja a  for all i D∈ , and, for some i D∈ , k i ja a  . 
 
4) Strategic Disimprovement:  
A strategic disimprovement is a change of stare ( , ) ( , ),j ka C a D→  where 
, ,j k C D C D≠ ≠ ≠∅∩ , ( , )ja C  is infeasible, and ( , )ka D  is feasible. Moreover, strategic 
disimprovement requires that: 
(1) i C D∃ ∈ ∩  such that k i ja a≺       
 (2) ;i C D∀ ∈ ∩    ( ) ( )i k i j iP a P a FD− ≤  
 (3) ;i D C∀ ∈ −  i kP (a ) iAcc≤  
Typically, ka  is not much worse than ja  for members of C D∩ , and is acceptable 
(reasonably good) for D C− . In this case, the members of D C− are looking for strategic 
disimprovement at minimum cost. The greater iFD , the more DM i is willing to retreat from a 
most preferred alternative in order to reach an agreement. 
Figure 3.1 shows a flowchart for determining whether there is a Preferential Improvement 
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Figure 3.1 -Flowchart for determining whether there is a Preferential Improvement 
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Likewise, we can provide some flowcharts for other types of movement. 
 
Theorem: It is impossible that two different types of movements occur simultaneously from 
a given initial state to a given subsequent state. 
 
Proof: We want to show that all four defined movements are mutually exclusive.  
Suppose that there is a disloyalty movement from an initial state ( , )ja C to a subsequent 
state ( , )ka D . We show that no preferential improvement nor agglomeration movement nor 
strategic disimprovement can occur from state ( , )ja C  to state ( , )ka D . 
If the movement ( , ) ( , )j ka C a D→ is a disloyalty movement, then , ,j k C D C D≠ ≠ ≠ ∅∩ , 
( , )ka D  is feasible and k i ja a   for all i D∈  and  k i ja a  for some i D∈  . 
The movement ( , ) ( , )j ka C a D→  cannot be a preferential improvement because 
C D≠ while a preferential improvement entailsC D= . It also cannot be an agglomeration 
movement since j k≠ , whereas in an agglomeration movement j k= . The disloyalty 
movement ( , ) ( , )j ka C a D→  cannot be a strategic disimprovement because k i ja a  for all 
,i D∈  while a condition for a strategic disimprovement is that k i ja a≺ for some i C D∈ ∩ . 
Since these two conditions are inconsistent, we can conclude that a strategic disimprovement 
is impossible. 
Now suppose that there is a preferential improvement from an initial state ( , )ja C to a 
subsequent state ( , )ka D . Since we have already shown that disloyalty movement and 
preferential improvement are mutually exclusive, we show that no agglomeration movement or 
strategic disimprovement can occur from state ( , )ja C  to state ( , )ka D . If the movement 
( , ) ( , )j ka C a D→  is a preferential improvement, then C D=  while both agglomeration move 
and strategic disimprovement entailC D≠ . An agglomeration move from state ( , )ja C  to 
state ( , )ka D  cannot be a strategic disimprovement because agglomeration move entails j k=  
whereas j k≠  in each strategic disimprovement. This can complete the proof. 
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3.2.2 The Likelihood of Movements 
If there is no movement from a specific state to another state according to the definitions, then 
we do not discuss the likelihood. The likelihood of occurrence of different moves is not the 
same. We now propose some criteria to measure the likelihood of moves. 
 
• Likelihood of Preferential Improvements: 
We classify all Preferential Improvements into three categories, Possible, Likely and Very 
Likely to reflect the degree of likelihood. We use two criteria, PI-Likelihood1 and PI-
Likelihood2. Consider the Preferential Improvement ( , ) ( , )j ka C a C→  .    
PI-Likelihood1 = 
1  ,      ( ) ( ) 1    for all 
0 ,                                       otherwise




If the move represents a major improvement for every decision maker in the coalition, then 
 PI-Likelihood1 = 1. 
PI-Likelihood2 =
1,        if 1





If the coalition possesses more than one decision maker, then PI-Likelihood2 = 1. Now we 
define 
PI-Likelihood = PI-Likelihood1 + PI-Likelihood2 
We say that the Likelihood for Preferential Improvement is Possible if PI-Likelihood = 0 , 
Likely if PI-Likelihood = 1, and Very Likely if PI-Likelihood = 2  
 











































• The Likelihood of Agglomeration: 
Like Preferential Improvements, we classify Agglomeration movements into three 
categories, Possible, Likely and Very likely. Consider the Agglomeration 
movement ( , ) ( , )j ja C a C′→ . 
AG-Likelihood1 = 
1  ,     if  ( , )   is feasible




There is more motivation to move to a feasible state, so if the subsequent state is feasible, then 
AG-Likelihood1 = 1. 
AG-Likelihood2 = i
1  ,         if P ( ) 1,
0 ,                                    otherwise
ja for i C C⎧ ′⎪ = ∀ ∈ −⎨
⎪⎩
 
Those decision makers who most prefer the alternative have more motivation to join the initial 
coalition. So if every joining decision maker is highly motivated, then AG-Likelihood2 = 1. 
Now define 
AG-Likelihood = AG-Likelihood1 + AG-Likelihood2 
 The Likelihood for Agglomeration movement is Possible if AG-Likelihood = 0 , Likely if 
AG-Likelihood = 1 , and Very likely if AG-Likelihood = 2  . 
 
• The Likelihood of Disloyalty: 
We classify all disloyalty movements into three categories, Possible, Likely and Very likely. 
Consider the disloyalty movement ( , ) ( , )j ka C a D→  . Define: 
DL-Likelihood1 = 
1  ,     if  ( , )   is infeasible





There is more motivation to move from an infeasible state. Hence, if the initial state is 
infeasible, DL-Likelihood1 = 1. 
DL-Likelihood2 = 
i k1  ,         P (a )    for
0 ,                                  otherwise




If the subsequent alternative is accepted by all decision makers forming the subsequent 
coalition, then DL-Likelihood2 = 1. Now define 
DL-Likelihood = DL-Likelihood1 + DL-Likelihood2 
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 Thus the Likelihood for Disloyalty movement is Possible, if DL-Likelihood=0 , Likely if 
DL-Likelihood=1 , and  Very likely if DL-Likelihood=2 . 
 
• The Likelihood of Strategic Disimprovement: 
We classify all strategic disimprovements into four categories, Unlikely, Possible, Likely 
and Very likely. Consider the strategic disimprovement ( , ) ( , )j ka C a D→ . Define 
SD-Likelihood1 = 
1  ,           ( )    for
0 ,                                           otherwise





If the subsequent alternative is accepted by all decision makers who move from the initial state 
to the subsequent one, then SD-Likelihood1 = 1. 
SD-Likelihood2 = 
k- 1  ,            , such that a  is uniquely worst for i
0 ,                                                                      otherwise





There is strong motivation for a decision maker to avoid his or her uniquely worst alternative. 
 Therefore, if the subsequent alternative is some DM’s uniquely worst alternative, then  
SD-Likelihood2 = -1. 
The alternative ka  is considered the uniquely worst alternative for i iff  ( )i kP a q A= =  where 
{ }1 2, ,..., qA a a a= . In other words, an alternative is a uniquely worst for DM i if all other 
alternatives are preferable to it. 
 
For example, consider the following case of preferences: 
:i A B C D∼ ∼  
Since ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 4i i iP B P C P D= = = ≠ , then DM i does not have a uniquely worst alternative. But 
in the preferences of  :i A B C D∼ ∼  
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 4i i i iP A P B P C and P D= = = = . Therefore, D is the uniquely worst alternative 
for i. 
 
SD-Likelihood3 = i k
1  ,         if   P (a ) 1   ,   
0 ,                                     otherwise






Those decision makers who most prefer the subsequent alternative have more motivation to 
support it. So, if all decision makers who join the initial coalition like the subsequent 
alternative best, then SD-Likelihood3 = 1. 
SD-Likelihood = SD-Likelihood1 + SD-Likelihood2 + SD-Likelihood3 
 
The Likelihood for strategic disimprovements is Unlikely, if SD-Likelihood = -1 , Possible 




Now, we illustrate these movements from one state to another using some examples. 
 
3.3.1 Example 1 
Suppose that three DMs, 1, 2 and 3, are involved in a negotiation to reach an agreement on one 
alternative among four available alternatives, A, B, D, and E. The preferences of each decision 
maker over the alternatives are transitive, as follows: (in decreasing order of preference) 
 A 1  B 1  E 1  D 
 B 2  E 2  A 2 D 
D 3  E 3  B 3  A 
 
The weights of the DMs in negotiation are as follows: 1 1w = , 2 2w = , and 3 3w = . The 
threshold of agreement is T = 4. Thus, a negotiation state is feasible if the sum of weights of 
the members of the associated coalition is at least equal to 4. 
For this example, there are 28 possible states because there are seven 3(2 1)− coalitions and 
each coalition may support one of four possible alternatives. Figure 3.3 shows the 16 
infeasible states. The arrows in this figure indicate possible preferential improvements from an 
infeasible state to another infeasible state. For instance, both DMs 1 and 2 prefer alternatives 
A, B and E to D. Hence, they may move from alternative D to E or B or A. 
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C = {1} 
 1w =∑  
C = {2} 
 2w =∑  
C = {3} 
 3w =∑  
C = {1,2} 
 3w =∑  
{ }( , 1 )A  { }( , 2 )B  { }( , 3 )D  { }( , 1, 2 )A  
{ }( , 1 )B  { }( , 2 )E  { }( , 3 )E  { }( , 1, 2 )B  
{ }( , 1 )E  { }( , 2 )A  { }( , 3 )B  { }( , 1, 2 )E  
{ }( , 1 )D  { }( , 2 )D  { }( , 3 )A  { }( , 1, 2 )D  
 
Figure 3.3: Infeasible states and Preferential Improvements among them 
 




C = {1,3} 
 4w =∑  
C = {2,3} 
 5w =∑  
C = {1,2,3} 
 6w =∑  
{ }( , 1,3 )A  { }( , 2,3 )B  { }( , 1, 2,3 )A  
{ }( , 1,3 )B  { }( , 2,3 )E  { }( , 1, 2,3 )B  
{ }( , 1,3 )E  { }( , 2,3 )A  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  
{ }( , 1,3 )D  { }( , 2,3 )D  { }( , 1, 2,3 )D  
Figure 3.4: Feasible states and Preferential Improvements among them 
 




Table 3.1: Preferential Improvements in Example 1 
 
Initial State Subsequent State PI-Likelihood1 PI-Likelihood2 PI-Likelihood 
{ }( , 1 )B  { }( , 1 )A 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1 )D  { }( , 1 )A 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1 )D  { }( , 1 )B 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1 )D  { }( , 1 )E 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1 )E  { }( , 1 )A 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1 )E  { }( , 1 )B 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 2 )A  { }( , 2 )B 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 2 )A  { }( , 2 )E 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 2 )D  { }( , 2 )A 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 2 )D  { }( , 2 )B 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 2 )D  { }( , 2 )E 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 2 )E  { }( , 2 )B 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 3 )A  { }( , 3 )B 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 3 )A  { }( , 3 )D 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )A  { }( , 3 )E 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )B  { }( , 3 )D 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )B  { }( , 3 )E 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 3 )E  { }( , 3 )D 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1, 2 )D  { }( , 1, 2 )A 0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )D  { }( , 1, 2 )B 1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )D  { }( , 1, 2 )E 0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )E  { }( , 1, 2 )B 0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 2,3 )A  { }( , 2,3 )B 0 1 Likely 
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{ }( , 2,3 )A  { }( , 2,3 )E 0 1 Likely 
 
 
We further assume that a DM will accept only one of his or her two most preferred 
alternatives. In other words, ; 2ii N Acc∀ ∈ = . With this assumption, we now list all possible 




Table 3.2: Agglomerations in Example 1 
 





{ }( , 1 )B  { }( , 1, 2 )B 0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 1 )D  { }( , 1,3 )D 1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 1 )E  { }( , 1, 2 )E 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1 )E  { }( , 1,3 )E 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1 )E  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 2 )A  { }( , 1, 2 )A 0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 2 )B  { }( , 1, 2 )B 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 2 )D  { }( , 2,3 )D 1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 2 )E  { }( , 2,3 )E 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )A  { }( , 1,3 )A 1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 3 )B  { }( , 1,3 )B 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )B  { }( , 2,3 )B 1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 3 )B  { }( , 1, 2,3 )B 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )E  { }( , 2,3 )E 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )D  { }( , 1, 2,3 )D 1 1 Very Likely 
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{ }( , 1, 2 )E  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1,3 )B  { }( , 1, 2,3 )B 1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 1,3 )E  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 2,3 )A  { }( , 1, 2,3 )A 1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 2,3 )B  { }( , 1, 2,3 )B 1 0 Likely 
 
 
Now, consider states in which one or more members of the coalition join other DMs 
outside the coalition to form a new coalition in support of another alternative preferred by the 
new coalition members such that the news state is feasible. These Disloyalty movements are 
listed in Table 3.3. 
 
 
Table 3.3: Disloyalty movements in Example 1 
 





{ }( , 2 )A  { }( , 2,3 )B 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 2 )A  { }( , 2,3 )E 1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 3 )A  { }( , 2,3 )B 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )A  { }( , 2,3 )E 1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )A  { }( , 2,3 )B 1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )A  { }( , 2,3 )E 1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 1,3 )A  { }( , 2,3 )B 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1,3 )A  { }( , 2,3 )E 0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2,3 )A  { }( , 2,3 )B 0 0 Possible 




Strategic disimprovements occur when one or more members of the initial coalition agree 
to move from an infeasible state to a feasible one, even though the new alternative is less 
preferable than the initial one. In this example, we suppose that all DMs accept at most one 
level of disimprovement from their initial position. In other words, 1iFD =  for i = 1, 2, 3. For 
example, DM 1, who likes agreement A best may accept agreement B - his second best 
alternative- when other DMs support it but will not accept agreement E - his third best - even 
if other DMs support it. The strategic disimprovements are listed in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4: Strategic Disimprovements in Example 1 
 








{ }( , 1 )B  { }( , 1,3 )E  0 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1 )B  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  0 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1 )E  { }( , 1,3 )D  0 -1 1 Possible 
{ }( , 2 )A  { }( , 2,3 )D  0 -1 1 Possible 
{ }( , 2 )B  { }( , 2,3 )E  1 0 0 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )B  { }( , 1,3 )A  0 -1 1 Possible 
{ }( , 3 )D  { }( , 2,3 )E  1 0 0 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )E  { }( , 1,3 )B  0 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 3 )E  { }( , 2,3 )B  0 0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )E  { }( , 1, 2,3 )B  0 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1, 2 )A  { }( , 2,3 )D  0 -1 1 Possible 
{ }( , 1, 2 )B  { }( , 1,3 )E  0 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1, 2 )B  { }( , 2,3 )E  1 0 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )B  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  0 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1, 2 )E  { }( , 1,3 )D  0 -1 1 Possible 
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There are no movements from the unanimous agreements over the alternatives B, E, and D. 
In other words, the states { }( , 1,2,3 )B , { }( , 1,2,3 )E  and { }( , 1,2,3 )D  are stable. { }( , 2,3 )E , 
{ }( , 1,3 )D and { }( , 2,3 )D are stable states for the similar reason. Also, { }( , 1 )A  is a stable state, 
even though, it is not feasible. In other words, we cannot predict any particular feasible 
agreement, if we began at a status quo in which decision maker 1 supports A. 
There is no movement to states { }( , 1 )D , { }( , 2 )D , { }( , 3 )A , { }( , 1,2 )D  and { }( , 2,3 )A from 
any other state, but there are very likely movements from these states to others. Therefore, 
these negotiation states are unstable.  
Now, suppose that the initial state is { }( , 2 )E . In figure 3.5, we trace movements from this 
state. Note that movements from state { }( , 2 )E cannot lead to an agreement on alternative A. 
Also, the model indicates that the feasible state { }( , 2,3 )E  is more likely to occur than the 
feasible state { }( , 1,2,3 ).E  
 
{ }( , 1,3 )E  
 
{ }( , 2 )E   { }( , 2 )B   { }( , 1, 2 )B    { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  
 
     
  { }( , 2,3 )E       
   
Figure 3.5: A tree of possible movements from a given state to other states 
 
To answer the question that to what extent the state { }( , 2,3 )E  is more likely to occur than 
the state { }( , 1,2,3 )E , we define the Likelihood Measure. A Likelihood Measure is a number 
associated with each potential outcome of a negotiation and indicates the possibility that a 
AG-Likely 
SD-Likely 






state occur as the final outcome of the negotiation. Suppose that we ascribe a subjective 
probability like 20%, 40%, 60% and 80% to each one of Unlikely, Possible, Likely and Very 
Likely movements, respectively. 
Based on the tree illustrated in Figure 3.5, we can determine the Likelihood Measure for 
potential outcomes of the negotiation explained in Example 1. 
 
{ }( , 2,3 )E    (0.6) + (0.4) (0.6) + (0.4) (0.4) (0.6) = 0.936 
{ }( , 1,2,3 )E    (0.4)(0.4)(0.4) + (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.6) = 0.102 
 
Since sum of 0.936 and 0.102 is more than 1, we normalize them such that their sum 
becomes 1. Table 3.5 shows the Likelihood Measures for potential outcomes of the negotiation 
explained in Example 1. Notice that the Likelihood Measure is not a probability. 
 
 
Table 3.5: Likelihood Measure for Example 1 
potential outcome Likelihood Measure 
{ }( , 2,3 )E  0.902 





3.3.2 Example 2 
In the previous example, make the following changes: 
• DM 2 is indifferent between alternatives A and D and DM 3 is indifferent 
between alternatives D and E. 
• 1 2 1.5w w= =  
• The threshold of agreement for alternative B is T = 5. 
• Fallback distance for DM 1 is 2. 
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Other conditions of this negotiation model are as in Example 1. Recall that the preferences of 
the decision maker over the alternatives are as follows:  
 
A 1  B 1  E 1  D 
B 2  E 2  A 2∼ D 
D 3∼  E 3  B 3  A 
We now analyze how the possible movements and their associated likelihoods will change 
under the new conditions. Table 3.6 – 3.9 list all types of movements for Example 2. 
 
 
Table 3.6: Preferential Improvements in Example 2 
 
Initial State Subsequent State PI-Likelihood1 PI-Likelihood2 PI-Likelihood 
{ }( , 1 )B  { }( , 1 )A  0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1 )D  { }( , 1 )A  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1 )D  { }( , 1 )B  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1 )D  { }( , 1 )E  0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1 )E  { }( , 1 )A  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1 )E  { }( , 1 )B  0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 2 )A  { }( , 2 )B  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 2 )A  { }( , 2 )E  0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 2 )D  { }( , 2 )B  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 2 )D  { }( , 2 )E  0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 2 )E  { }( , 2 )B  0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 3 )A  { }( , 3 )B  0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 3 )A  { }( , 3 )D  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )A  { }( , 3 )E  1 0 Likely 
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{ }( , 3 )B  { }( , 3 )D  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )B  { }( , 3 )E  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )D  { }( , 1, 2 )A  0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )D  { }( , 1, 2 )B  1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )D  { }( , 1, 2 )E  0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )E  { }( , 1, 2 )B  0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 1,3 )D  { }( , 1,3 )E  0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 2,3 )A  { }( , 2,3 )B  0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 2,3 )A  { }( , 2,3 )D  0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 2,3 )A  { }( , 2,3 )E  0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 2,3 )D  { }( , 2,3 )E  0 1 Likely 



























Table 3.7: Agglomerations in Example 2 
 
Initial State Subsequent State AG-Likelihood1 AG-Likelihood2 AG-Likelihood 
{ }( , 1 )B  { }( , 1, 2 )B  0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 1 )D  { }( , 1,3 )D  1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 1 )E  { }( , 1, 2 )E  0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1 )E  { }( , 1,3 )E  1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 1 )E  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 2 )A  { }( , 1, 2 )A  0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 2 )B  { }( , 1, 2 )B  0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 2 )D  { }( , 2,3 )D  1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 2 )E  { }( , 2,3 )E  1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 3 )A  { }( , 1,3 )A  1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 3 )B  { }( , 1,3 )B  0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 3 )B  { }( , 2,3 )B  0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )B  { }( , 1, 2,3 )B  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )E  { }( , 2,3 )E  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )D  { }( , 1, 2,3 )D  1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )E  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 1,3 )B  { }( , 1, 2,3 )B  1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 1,3 )E  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 2,3 )A  { }( , 1, 2,3 )A  1 1 Very Likely 







Table 3.8: Disloyalty movements in Example 2 
 
Initial State Subsequent State DL-Likelihood1 DL-Likelihood2 DL-Likelihood 
{ }( , 1 )D  { }( , 1,3 )E  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1 )D  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 2 )A  { }( , 2,3 )D  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 2 )A  { }( , 2,3 )E  1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 2 )D  { }( , 2,3 )E  1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 2 )D  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )A  { }( , 2,3 )D  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )A  { }( , 2,3 )E  1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 3 )D  { }( , 1,3 )E  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )D  { }( , 2,3 )E  1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 3 )D  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )A  { }( , 2,3 )D  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )A  { }( , 2,3 )E  1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )D  { }( , 1,3 )E  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )D  { }( , 2,3 )E  1 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )D  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  1 0 Likely 
{ }( , 1,3 )A  { }( , 2,3 )D  0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1,3 )A  { }( , 2,3 )E  0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 1,3 )D  { }( , 2,3 )E  0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 1,3 )D  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 2,3 )D  { }( , 1,3 )E  0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 2,3 )D  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1, 2,3 )A  { }( , 2,3 )D  0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1, 2,3 )A  { }( , 2,3 )E  0 1 Likely 
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{ }( , 1, 2,3 )D  { }( , 1,3 )E  0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1, 2,3 )D  { }( , 2,3 )E  0 1 Likely 
 
 
Table 3.9: Strategic Disimprovements in Example 2 
 









{ }( , 1 )A  { }( , 1,3 )E  0 0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 1 )A  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  0 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1 )B  { }( , 1,3 )D  0 -1 1 Possible 
{ }( , 1 )B  { }( , 1,3 )E  0 0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 1 )B  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  0 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1 )E  { }( , 1,3 )D  0 -1 1 Possible 
{ }( , 2 )B  { }( , 2,3 )E  1 0 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 2 )E  { }( , 2,3 )D  0 -1 1 Possible 
{ }( , 3 )B  { }( , 1,3 )A  0 -1 1 Possible 
{ }( , 1, 2 )A  { }( , 1,3 )E  0 0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )A  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  0 0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )B  { }( , 1,3 )D  0 -1 1 Possible 
{ }( , 1, 2 )B  { }( , 1,3 )E  0 0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )B  { }( , 2,3 )E  1 0 1 Very Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )B  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  0 0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 1, 2 )E  { }( , 1,3 )D  0 -1 1 Possible 
{ }( , 1, 2 )E  { }( , 2,3 )D  0 -1 1 Possible 
{ }( , 1, 2 )E  { }( , 1,2,3 )D  0 -1 1 Possible 
{ }( , 1,3 )B  { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  0 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 2,3 )B  { }( , 1,3 )A  0 -1 1 Possible 
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There is no movement from the unanimous agreements over the alternatives B and E, so 
that states { }( , 1, 2,3 )B  and { }( , 1,2,3 )E  are stable. The only other stable state is { }( , 2,3 )E . 
Compared with the Example 1, the number of stable states in this example is reduced due to 
the larger number of movements.  
Suppose again that the initial state is { }( , 2 )E . In Figure 3.6, we trace subsequent 











































Although Figure 3.6 shows some changes in movements due to the changes in input data, it 
indicates that the ultimate outcomes of the negotiation are the same. This figure shows feasible 
states { }( , 2,3 )E and { }( , 1,2,3 )E  as the likely outcomes of the negotiation and indicates that 
{ }( , 2,3 )E  is still predicted as the most likely state. The likelihood measures for these two 
states are: 
{ }( , 2,3 )E    (0.8) + (0.4) (0.8) + (0.4) (0.6) + (0.4) (0.4) (0.8) + (0.4) (0.4) 
(0.4) (0.6) = 1.5264 
 
{ }( , 1,2,3 )E     (0.4) (0.4) + (0.4) (0.4) (0.6) + (0.4) (0.4) (0.6) + (0.4) (0.4) 
(0.4) (0.4) + (0.4) (0.4) (0.6) (0.6) + (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.6) (0.6) = 0.45824 
Table 3.10 shows the normalized Likelihood Measures for potential outcomes of the 
negotiation explained in Example 2. 
 
Table 3.10: Likelihood Measure for Example 2 
potential outcome Likelihood Measure 
{ }( , 2,3 )E  0.769 
{ }( , 1,2,3 )E  0.231 
 
3.4 Sensitivity Analyses 
A sensitivity analysis is used to assess whether or not possible revisions in DMs’ preferences 
and unforeseen changes in the model can affect the conclusions of the analysis. For example, a 
range of possible preferences can be analyzed to ascertain how the likely outcomes of a 
negotiation are affected. If the results do not change when preferences are slightly modified, 
the results of the analysis are robust, and one can have greater confidence in them. 
Alternatively, when a small change in the input data causes a dramatic change in the output of 
the model, then the analyst should ensure that the model is as accurate and reliable as possible 
before drawing conclusions. The followings are some types of sensitivity analysis that could 
be applied in modeling negotiations: 
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• Alternative modification or expansion 
• Alternative’ threshold change 
• DM’s preference changes 
• DM’s weight change 
• DM’s fallback distance change 
• DM’s acceptability change 
There are a number of ways to do a Sensitivity Analysis, including a systematic Exhaustive 
Sensitivity Analysis in which one examines the effects of all possible changes in model 
parameters. Alternatively, one can identify the most plausible parameter changes and then 
determine how they affect the results. A systematic exhaustive sensitivity analysis usually 
entails a very large number of individual calculations and is therefore not easy to do. For 
example, in Example 1 in Section 3.3.1, the number of all possible changes in one player’s 
preference orders is (4! –1) + (4! –1) + (4! -1) = 69. If one desires to execute an exhaustive 
sensitivity analysis for the Fallback Distance of a DM in that example, he or she would carry 
out (4 -1) *3 = 9 repetitions of the sensitivity analysis, as each DM’s Fallback Distance can be 
0, 1, 2, or 3 and we have 3 DMs. Example 1 in Section 3.3.1 is a simple model. An exhaustive 
sensitivity analysis for more practical models like the Caspian Sea negotiations - which will be 
discussed in Chapter 5 – would be an enormous task to undertake. 
In the following sections, we implement some minor changes in input data of Example 1 to 
evaluate to what extent the results will be changed. 
 
3.4.1 Sensitivity Analysis 1   
We change only DM 3’s preferences over his acceptable alternatives, so the preferences of 
each decision maker over the alternatives are as follows:  
A 1  B 1  E 1  D 
 B 2  E 2  A 2  D 
E 3  D 3  B 3  A 
   
The weights of the DMs in negotiation are not changed and are as follows: 1 1w = , 2 2w = , 
and 3 3w = . The threshold of agreement is again T = 4. Table 3.11 shows the stable states of 
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sensitivity analysis 1. 
 
Table 3.11: The stable states of Sensitivity Analysis 1 
Stable state Feasibility status 
{ }( , 1 )A  Infeasible 
{ }( , 2,3 )E  Feasible 
{ }( , 1, 2,3 )B  Feasible 
{ }( , 1, 2,3 )E  Feasible 
 
Due to the change in DM 3’s preferences, the total number of movements increases and the 
number of stable states decreases. As Table 3.11 indicates, the states { }( , 1,2,3 )D , 
{ }( , 1,3 )D and { }( , 2,3 )D which were stable in Example 1, are no longer stable. 
Now, suppose that the initial state is { }( , 2 )E . In figure 3.7, we trace all subsequent 
movements from this initial state. Like Example 1, feasible states { }( , 2,3 )E and { }( , 1,2,3 )E  
are the likely outcomes of the negotiation and { }( , 2,3 )E  is still predicted as the most likely 
state. Although minor changes are seen in the likelihood of movements, there is no significant 
difference between the movements in Figure 3.7 and those shown in Figure 3.5. 
 
{ }( , 1,3 )E  
 
{ }( , 2 )E   { }( , 2 )B   { }( , 1, 2 )B    { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  
 
 
  { }( , 2,3 )E       
 Figure 3.7: A tree of possible movements for Sensitivity Analysis 1 
AG-Very Likely 
SD-Very Likely 
PI- Possible AG-Possible 
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SD- Likely 




Table 3.12 shows the normalized Likelihood Measures for potential outcomes of the 
negotiation explained in sensitivity analysis 1. 
 
 
Table 3.12:  Likelihood Measure for sensitivity analysis 1 
potential outcome Likelihood Measure 
{ }( , 2,3 )E  0.89 
{ }( , 1,2,3 )E  0.11 
 
If we compare the Likelihood Measure for Sensitivity Analysis 1 with those of Example 1, we 
observe just a slight difference. 
 
 
3.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 2 
We replace the preferences of the second preferred and the third preferred alternatives of DM 
2. So, the preferences of each decision maker over the alternatives are as follows:  
 A 1  B 1  E 1  D 
 B 2  A 2  E 2  D 
   D 3  E 3  B 3  A 
 
All other conditions of this negotiation model are identical to Example 1.   
All possible movements and their associated likelihoods are analyzed to evaluate to what 
extent the results will be changed under the new preferences. Table 3.13 shows the stable 








Table 3.13: The stable states of Sensitivity Analysis 2 
 
Stable state Feasibility status 
{ }( , 3 )D  Infeasible 
{ }( , 1,3 )D  Feasible 
{ }( , 1,3 )E  Feasible 
{ }( , 2,3 )D  Feasible 
{ }( , 2,3 )E  Feasible 
{ }( , 1, 2,3 )B  Feasible 
{ }( , 1, 2,3 )D  Feasible 
{ }( , 1, 2,3 )E  Feasible 
 
 
As Table 3.13 indicates, the state { }( , 1 )A which was stable in Example 1 is no longer stable 
because there is an agglomeration move from this state to state { }( , 1, 2 )A . Instead, the 
state { }( , 3 )D  which was unstable in Example 1 due to a strategic disimprovement to the state 
{ }( , 2,3 )E  is now stable. Also, the state { }( , 1,3 )E which was unstable in Example 1 due to an 
agglomeration move to { }( , 1, 2,3 )E  is now stable because the alternative E is no longer 
acceptable for DM 2. 
Again suppose that the initial state is { }( , 2 )E . In Figure 3.8, we trace all subsequent 








 { }( , 2 )B   { }( , 1, 2 )B    { }( , 1,3 )E  
          
          
      
{ }( , 2 )A   { }( , 1, 2 )A    { }( , 2,3 )B  
         
    
 
{ }( , 2 )E       { }( , 2,3 )E   { }( , 1, 2,3 )B  
          
            
{ }( , 2,3 )D  
 
Figure 3.8: A tree of possible movements for Sensitivity Analysis 2 
 
 
Figure 3.8 shows that feasible states { }( , 1,3 )E , { }( , 2,3 )E , { }( , 2,3 )D  and { }( , 1, 2,3 )B  are 
the likely outcomes of negotiation. Table 3.14 shows the normalized Likelihood Measures for 
potential outcomes of the negotiation in Sensitivity Analysis 2. 
 
Table 3.14: Likelihood Measure for Sensitivity Analysis 2 
 
potential outcome Likelihood Measure 
{ }( , 1,3 )E  0.076 
{ }( , 2,3 )E  0.532 
{ }( , 2,3 )D  0.249 












AG - Likely 
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There are quite a few changes in the results of this example as compared with those of 
Example 1. Hence, predictions of the ultimate outcome of the negotiation if the status quo 
is { }( , 2 )E  are more difficult. However, Table 3.5 indicates that the state { }( , 2,3 )E  is still the 
most likely outcome of negotiation. Additionally, if we compare the changes in the results of 
this sensitivity analysis with those of Sensitivity Analysis 1 we see that the changes here are 
more significant. This conclusion is plausible because in Sensitivity Analysis 1 we reversed 
the preferences of two acceptable alternatives of DM 3 while in Sensitivity Analysis 2 we did 
reversed the preference of an acceptable alternative with that of a non-acceptable one of DM 2.  
 
 
3.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 3  
We now suppose that 2Acc 3= . In other words, Decision Maker 2 accepts his or her top three 
preferred alternatives, rather than only the top two alternatives. The preferences of decision 
makers over the alternatives and other conditions of the negotiation are identical to Example 1.  
This change does not affect preferential improvements and their likelihoods because 
preferential improvements are not related to the acceptability but the number of 
agglomerations increases due to DM 2 accepting more alternatives. 
Disloyalty movements are exactly identical to disloyalty movements in Example 1 because the 
preferences of decision makers over the alternatives are the same as Example 1, whereas the 
number of strategic disimprovements increases due to DM 2 accepting more alternatives. 
The stable states are identical to the stable states of Example 1, except that the infeasible 
state { }( , 1 )A  is not stable here. The tree of possible movements from the initial state { }( , 2 )E  to 
other states is exactly as in Example 1. In other words, the model indicates that the feasible 
states { }( , 2,3 )E  and  { }( , 1,2,3 )E    are the likely outcomes of the negotiation provided that the 
initial state is { }( , 2 )E . Additionally, { }( , 2,3 )E  is more likely to occur than { }( , 1,2,3 ).E  
Hence, we can conclude that the model is not sensitive to the extension of acceptability of 
decision maker 2, at least when the initial state is { }( , 2 )E . 
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3.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis 4  
We now suppose that 1 0FD = . In other words, decision maker 1 will not accept falling back to 
a less preferred alternative.  
Fallback distance is used only to determine strategic disimprovements. Therefore, change 
in this parameter does not cause any change in other types of movements. Thus, all movements 
in this example except for strategic disimprovements are identical to those in Example 1, 
shown in Tables 3.1 to 3.3. 
Since 1FD  is less than that in Example 1, the number of strategic disimprovements 
















{ }( , 2 )A  { }( , 2,3 )D  0 -1 1 Possible 
{ }( , 2 )B  { }( , 2,3 )E  1 0 0 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )B  { }( , 1,3 )A  0 -1 1 Possible 
{ }( , 3 )D  { }( , 2,3 )E  1 0 0 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )E  { }( , 1,3 )B  0 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 3 )E  { }( , 2,3 )B  0 0 1 Likely 
{ }( , 3 )E  { }( , 1, 2,3 )B  0 0 0 Possible 
{ }( , 1, 2 )A  { }( , 2,3 )D  0 -1 1 Possible 
{ }( , 1, 2 )B  { }( , 2,3 )E  1 0 0 Likely 
 
 
The stable states are exactly identical to those of Example 1. Figure 3.9 shows the tree of 




  { }( , 2 )E    { }( , 2 )B    { }( , 1, 2 )B  
              
 
 
{ }( , 2,3 )E  
Figure 3.9: A tree of possible movements for Sensitivity Analysis 4 
 
As Figure 3.9 indicates, the only predicted outcome of the negotiation is { }( , 2,3 )E , which 
is feasible and stable. Unlike Example 1, the state { }( , 1, 2,3 )E , which indicates on a unanimous 
agreement over the alternative E, is not predicted as possible outcome, due to the fact that E is 




This chapter is devoted to proposing a new methodology in order to model and analyze a 
specific structure of multilateral negotiations. Six new concepts are defined in this chapter to 
pave the construction of the proposed methodology which is based on four types of 
movements from unstable states to stable ones. Some criteria are proposed to measure the 
likelihood of different moves. A theorem proved in this chapter shows that all four defined 
movements are mutually exclusive. It is illustrated how the proposed methodology is applied 
in order to predict the most likely outcomes of multilateral negotiations using some examples. 
Four cases of sensitivity analysis are applied to assess whether sudden or unforeseen changes 
in the model do not affect the conclusion of stability analyses. In Chapter 4 we explain how a 




SD - Likely AG-Likely SD-Likely 







Negotiation Support System  





In the previous chapter, we developed a conceptual model for multilateral negotiations. In this 
chapter, we will develop a practical Negotiation Support System (NSS). The following are the 
most important motivations to design and implement a NSS: 
• General ideas about movements and their associated likelihoods must be developed and 
converted to precise definitions and a clear methodology in order to be studied in 
detail. To refine these raw ideas we need to obtain and observe tangible outputs, which 
will encourage us to refine or modify definitions and methodologies as appropriate. 
• In most real-world problems, there is a great deal of data. Evaluations of the 
movements and their associated likelihoods in these cases are very time consuming. 
NSS increases the speed of calculations, as well as helping us to avoid mistakes in 
manual calculations.  
• For applications and for refinement of definitions, we need sensitivity analysis.  It is 
important to understand the effects of small changes in input data on the predicted 
outcomes of the negotiation. With automatic calculations, we do not need to recalculate 
the entire model when just one input datum changes.   
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4-2 Design  
Since the concept and components of the proposed Negotiation Support System are similar to 
those of a Decision Support System, we review the main components of a decision support 
system in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 - Main components of a decision support system as defined by Sage (1991) 
 
We start from an Entity Relationship Model to design a data-model in order to implement a 
database which is driven in Microsoft Access. Then we use Microsoft Visual Basic 6 to carry 
out the definitions and methodology, which are implemented in Business Logic and User 
Interface layers. Business logic is a non-technical term generally used to describe the 
functional algorithms that handle information exchange between a database and a user 
interface. The user interface (or Human Machine Interface) constitutes the means by which the 
users interact with a system, which may be a machine, a device, a computer program or some 
other complex tools.  
An entity-relationship (ER) diagram illustrates the interrelationships among entities. An 
entity is something about which data is collected, stored, and maintained. Figure 4.2 shows 
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Figure 4.2 – Symbols of ER diagrams 




Figures 4.3 illustrates examples of different relations between the entities A and B. 
Sections (a) and (b) of this Figure represent “one-to-many” and “one-to-one” relations, 
respectively. More specifically, section (a) indicates that one A is associated with one or more 








Figure 4.3 – Examples of different relations between entities 
 









Figure 4.4 - Entity Relationship Diagram for the proposed NSS 
 
As Figure 4.4 shows, each state includes just one coalition but each coalition can be 
ascribed to several states. The relation between Decision Maker and Coalition entities is 
originally “many-to-many”, meaning that each decision maker may be found in several 
coalitions and each coalition may include several decision makers. This “many-to-many” 
relationship is decomposed to two “one-to-many” relationships creating a link entity called 
“CoalitionDecisionMaker”.        
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Figure 4.5 shows the information flow among the user interface, the input data, the 
analysis engine of the proposed NSS, and the output data. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 - The structure of the proposed Negotiation Support System (Adapted from 
Fang, et. al., 2003).  
 
Figure 4.6 shows a Data Model Diagram for the proposed NSS. A data model illustrates 






Figure 4.6 - Data Model Diagram for the proposed NSS (Microsoft Access Screen) 
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4.3 Implementation 
Figure 4.7 suggests a general application procedure for the proposed Negotiation Support 


































Figure 4.7 - Applying the proposed Negotiation Support Systems (adapted from Figure 
1.3.1. Fang, et al., 1993) 
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Now we show some of the forms which have been designed as part of the interface of the 
proposed NSS. The input data of each negotiation are entered through the Basic Data menu of 
the system. For example, Figure 4.8 shows how the specifications of Decision Maker 1 (in 




Figure 4.8 – Specifications of a Decision Maker as input data 
 
 









Table 4.1: Specifications of menus of the proposed NSS 
Menu Submenu Explanation 
Basic Data 
Decision Maker Enter the specifications of Decision Makers 
Alternative Enter the specifications of Alternatives 
Decision Maker 
Preferences 
Enter the preferences of Decision Makers over all 
alternatives 
Generating 
Coalition Generates all possible coalitions 
State Generates all possible states 
Movement Generates a from/to matrix of all states 
Calculation 
Coalition Weight Calculates the weights of all potential coalitions 
State Feasibility Determines the feasibility or infeasibility of all states  
Analysis 
Movements Analyzes all possible movements from initial states to 
subsequent ones 
Report Movement Presents the final results 
Exit -------- Exits from the program 
 
 
Figure 4.9 shows how the specifications of Alternative A (in Example 1 of Chapter 3) are 








Figure 4.9 – Specifications of an Alternative as input data 
 
 
Decision Maker Preferences is the last submenu of Basic Data. The user selects one 
decision maker through the Decision Maker FullName ComboBox and assigns one alternative 
through the Alternative FullName ComboBox. Then, he or she enters the Preference rank of 
the selected decision maker for the specified alternative. Figure 4.10 shows that alternative A 
is the most preferred alternative for Decision Maker 1, i.e., DM 1 gives alternative A 





Figure 4.10 – Decision Maker’s preference for an alternative as input data 
 
 
The second main menu of the system is Generating. When this menu is selected, all 
potential coalitions and states of the negotiation are constructed, based on the input data 
already entered. In addition, a structure for potential movements from the initial to the 
subsequent states is constructed by running Movement, the last submenu of Model Generation. 
The first submenu of the Calculation menu, called Coalition Weight, calculates the weights of 
all potential coalitions by summing the weights of all decision makers in the coalition. When 
State Feasibility, the second submenu of the Calculation menu, is selected, the feasibility or 
infeasibility of all states is determined. State feasibility is determined by a comparison 
between the coalition’s weight in a given state and the threshold of the alternative supported 
by the coalition. (See Ch.3)  
To analyze all possible movements from initial to subsequent states, we select the analysis 
menu. As soon as we select this menu, a form illustrating the analysis processes appears. This 
form shows which parts of the process are complete and which parts are not. The process starts 
with the identification of preferential improvements, and then their associated likelihoods. 
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Then it investigates all agglomeration movements and their likelihoods and then repeats the 
calculations for Disloyalty moves. When all strategic disimprovements have been identified 
and their likelihood determined, the process is complete and we can run the Report menu. 








The Report form presents the final results. This report is a List-View object in Visual 
Basic. All movements from initial states to subsequent states, in addition to their associated 
likelihoods, are clearly illustrated. All stable states are distinguished by a check mark (Left 
column). Feasible stable states are shown distinctively in red colour and bold. Figure 4.12 
demonstrates that the state }{( , 1 )A  is a stable but infeasible state. It also shows a possible 
preferential improvement from }{( , 1 )B  to }{( , 1 )A  and a likely one from }{( , 1 )D  to }{( , 1 )A . This 









The design and implementation of a practical Negotiation Support System is briefly 
explained in this chapter. This Negotiation Support System has been implemented in Microsoft 
Access using Microsoft Visual Basic, based on the conceptual model for multilateral 
negotiations proposed in Chapter 3. Two real-world multilateral negotiations will be modeled 









Case Study 1 – Modeling the Caspian Sea 
Negotiations 
 
5.1 Power in Negotiations 
In this chapter, the methodology proposed in the previous chapter will be used to model and 
analyse multilateral negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea. The most 
challenging step in modeling the Caspian Sea negotiations is to estimate the DMs’ weights.  
In some multilateral negotiations, the weights of DMs and the thresholds for potential 
agreements are clear and prespecified. The following are some examples: 
• Decision mechanism of the Security Council of the United Nations. 
• Voting system of the European Union. 
A negotiation in the US Congress to approve a proposed bill could also be considered another 
example of multilateral negotiations in which the weights of DMs and the thresholds of 
agreement are clear, if each party is treated as one DM and the number of senators or 
representatives of that party is its weight. Of course, this model assumes that members of a 
party vote identically. In these examples, DMs’ weights reflect their level of legitimacy in the 
voting system. Modeling is easier than when the weights of the DMs are not clearly stipulated.  
 
To model multilateral negotiations like those over the Caspian Sea, DMs’ weights must be 
determined based on their capabilities in the negotiation process. In practice, the powers of the 
DMs must be estimated quantitatively by the analyst. In these cases, the fundamental issue is 
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the notion of power itself: What is it that enables one party to gain something from another in 
a negotiation? 
Power is a basic concept in both physics and political science. To the physicist, power has 
a precise definition; to the political scientist, it is vague. At the same time, it is hard to go very 
deep into an analysis of negotiations without invoking the concept of power. The natural 
science definition of power faces many conceptual problems when it is imported into the social 
sciences. In physics, power is defined simply as work done divided by the time taken to 
accomplish it. Time has a standard measurement and work is defined by the force, which is 
required to move an object, and the distance.  
Since the early 1930s, social scientists have had a good working definition of power as the 
ability of one party to move another party in an intended direction. Originally formulated by 
Tawney (1931/1952:159), this idea was widely adopted in the 1950s – by decision theorists 
such as Herbert Simon (1953), political scientists like Robert Dahl (1957), and social 
psychologists such as John Thibaut and Harold Kelley (1959). It is obvious that “move” refers 
here not to physical displacement but to change in position, in thought and action. A variant 
conceptualization considers power as the value added to a particular outcome (Schelling 
1960; Zartman 1974). One agent exercises power in its relationship with another when its 
actions can negatively or positively alter the value of a particular action with respect to 
reaching to target. This approach retains the notion of power as a bilateral relation, and 
provides a common dimension on which to compare and aggregate different expressions of 
power. The stronger party is the one that can add (or subtract) more value to (or from) the 
other’s outcome. One way of categorizing the actions that produce movement is as pressure 
(negative), inducement (positive), and resistance (negative or positive response). Thus, 
contingent moves can be divided into threats and warnings (negative) and promises (positive).  
There are two main difficulties in measurement of power. First, resources come in many 
shapes and sizes, making them difficult to aggregate them within a single measure. Second, 
resources also come shapelessly, for example in leadership or moral rights, obligations, or 
commitments. Therefore, it is very difficult to measure precisely the power of decision makers 
in negotiations. 
An understanding of the nature and significance of power asymmetry is obviously 
important for a better understanding of the strategic problems represented by the real-world 
 85
conflicts. Hierarchical power involves the ability of a decision maker to choose a strategy in 
the knowledge of the opponent’s choice. A flexible concept of hierarchical power has been 
developed within the framework of non-cooperative game theory to extend the systems-theory 
approach to the analysis of strategic interactions among decision makers having asymmetric 
roles (De et al., 1990). Hierarchical power, a model for power asymmetry, has been also used 
in conjunction with other principles of personnel management to analyze the behavior of 
professionals during negotiations in an organization (De et al., 1994). 
Stoll and Ward (1989) attempted to measure nations’ power quantitatively. They refer to 
some multivariate indexes representing the power of states (nations). A straightforward linear 
index was suggested by Alcock and Newcombe (1970), who used a regression equation to 
measure relative power of nations. They saw relative power as dependent on three factors: 
gross national product per capita, population, and population density. They came up with the 
relation: 
Relative power = - 16.1 + 0.69 population + 0.49 GNP/cap + 0.08 area/cap. 
While this equation is not quite appropriate for the negotiation over the Caspian Sea, it can be 
used as a starting point. 
 
 
5.2 Calibrating the Model; Decision Makers’ Weights 
In the negotiation over the legal status of the Caspian Sea, the weights of the decision makers 
and the thresholds for agreement are not prespecified. As explained in previous sections, the 
countries around the Caspian Sea are not unanimous over whether it is a sea, a lake, or another 
kind of body of water; agreement on the sea or lake question would permit the legal status to 
be resolved based on international law. We proceed to estimate the power of the countries 
involved in these negotiations by applying a Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) 
model. It should be emphasised that this is an estimation problem and that precise 
measurement of the nations’ powers is not possible because some criteria like diplomatic 





5.2.1 The criteria 
Table 5-1 lists all criteria that are considered to be important determinants of countries’ 
capabilities in Caspian Sea negotiations. For each criterion, associated indicators are also 
given. Later we discuss how to combine indicator values to obtain weights for the countries.  
 
 
Table 5.1: criteria and indicators applied to estimate the weights of the countries 
Criteria Number Indicator 
Economic Independence 
and Self sufficiency 
1-1 GNI/capita 
1-2 Net trade / GDP 
1-3 GDP/ Claimed Caspian Sea oil and natural gas 
Military status of the 
country 
 
2-1 Yearly Military Expenditures 
2-2 Military Expenditures/ GDP 
2-3 Active troops/ Population 
2-4 Nuclear power status 
US Support 
3-1 US Financial support 
3-2 US Political support 
Political Influence and 
Structure 
4-1 The Territory of Political Influence 
4-2 Democracy Level  
 
 
1) Economic Independence and Self sufficiency: 
 
Indicators: 
1-1) GNI/capita  
The higher the GNI/capita, the wealthier the country. Gross National Income comprises the 
total value of goods and services produced within a country (i.e. its Gross Domestic Product), 
together with its income received from other countries (notably interest and dividends), less 
similar payments made to other countries. For example, if a British-owned company operating 
in the US sends some of its profits back to UK, the UK’s GNI is enhanced, and the amount 
will not count toward US GNI (Yahoo! Canada Answers, 2007). In other words, Gross 
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National Income is the value of all income earned by residents of an economy whether it is 
earned within or outside of the national boundary (Definitions of GNI on the Web, 2007). 




Table 5.2: GNI/capita 
Country GNI per capita 
(US $) 
Out of 10 
 
Azerbaijan 1,240 2.78 
Kazakhstan 2,930 6.57 
Iran 2,770 6.21 
Russia 4,460 10 
Turkmenistan 1,340 3 
 
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1235976.stm (Sep. 9, 07) 
The World Bank - Data for the year 2006.  
 
 




The higher Net trade /GDP, the greater the Economic Independence. The gross domestic 
product (GDP) is a primary indicator of the health of a country's economy. It represents the 
total value of all goods and services produced within a country over a specific time period. It is 
usually thought of as the size of the economy. (Investopedia, 2007) Table 5.3 illustrates the 






Table 5.3:  Net trade / GDP 
 
Country Net trade 












Azerbaijan 136 20,122 0.68 0.82 1.57 
Kazakhstan 10,497 77,237 13.6 3.69 7.07 
Iran 21,337 222,889 9.6 3.1 5.94 
Russia 142,667 986,940 14.5 3.81 7.3 
Turkmenistan 2,854 10,496 27.2 5.22 10 
 
Source: Trade Competitiveness Map 
http://www.intracen.org/appli1/TradeCom/TP_EP_CI.aspx?RP=031&YR=2005 (Sep. 9, 2007) 
List of countries by GDP, List by the World Bank, 2006 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28nominal%29  (Sep. 14, 2007) 
 
In Table 5.3, the square root function is used to capture the non-linearity of the criteria. 
This transformation reflects the concavity of the function y x= . For instance, the difference 
between 2 and 3 in the Net trade as % of GDP column is more significant than the difference 
between 20 and 21. Hence, we use the square root function to give a rough representation of 
the non-linear nature of the criterion.   
 
1-3) GDP/ Claimed Caspian Sea oil and natural gas 
 The higher the ratio of GDP/Claimed Caspian Sea oil and natural gas, the more willing the 
country to wait for benefits from the Caspian Sea. In other words, countries for which the 
relative benefit of the oil and natural gas of the Caspian Sea is very high need an agreement 
over its legal status to extract these resources as soon as possible. On the other hand, countries 
that possess other resources are not so dependent on these sources and can wait to achieve 
more preferable alternatives in the negotiations. The information in the third column (Claimed 
oil and natural gas) of Table 5.4 is from the bankruptcy procedure section of Chapter 2. 
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Caspian Sea Oil 






Azerbaijan 20,122 2580 7.8 2.79 1.46 
Kazakhstan 77,237 5968 12.94 3.6 1.88 
Iran 222,889 2702 82.49 9.08 4.75 
Russia 986,940 2702 365.27 19.11 10 
Turkmenistan 10,496 3838 2.73 1.65 0.86 
 
 
2) Military status of the country: 
The following criteria help us to estimate the military capability of the countries. 
Indicators:  
 
2-1) Yearly Military Expenditures 
This statistic reflects the level of military buildup and army modernization for a countriy. 
Table 5.5 shows the Yearly Military Expenditures of the countries around the Caspian Sea and 
provides a non-linear ranking, for reasons similar to those discussed above. 
 
Table 5.5:  Yearly Military Expenditures  
Country Military Expenditures 
(millions of USD) 
Square Root Out of 10 
 
Azerbaijan 1100 33.17 1.84 
Kazakhstan 221.8 14.89 0.83 
Iran 6,300 79.37 4.41 
Russia 32,400 180 10 
Turkmenistan 90 9.49 0.53 
 




2-2) Military Expenditures/ GDP 
This ratio indicates how much priority each country places on military expenditure. In 
other words, it represents the percentage of gross domestic product of a country that is spent 
for military purposes. Again, it is scaled non-linearly using the square root function.          
 
Table 5.6:  Military Expenditures/ GDP 
Country Military 
Expenditures 











Azerbaijan 1100 20,122 5.5 2.35 10 
Kazakhstan 221.8 77,237 0.29 0.54 2.29 
Iran 6,300 222,889 2.8 1.67 7.12 
Russia 32,400 986,940 3.28 1.81 7.71 
Turkmenistan 90 10,496 0.86 0.93 3.95 
 
2-3) Active troops/ Population 
This ratio indicates how much priority each country places on having active troops. Table 
5.7 measures aactive troops per capita for the five Caspian Sea countries. 
 
Table 5.7:  Active troops/ Population 






Out of 10 
 
Azerbaijan 126 8400 1.5 10 
Kazakhstan 65 15400 0.422 2.81 
Iran 545 68500 0.796 5.31 
Russia 1200 143800 0.834 5.56 
Turkmenistan 26 5000 0.52 3.47 
 
Sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_size_of_armed_forces (Sep. 8, 07) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1235976.stm (Sep. 8, 2007) 
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A positive correlation is to be expected between the results of the two previous indicators, 
Military Expenditures/ GDP and Active troops/ Population since both indicators evaluate to 
what extent the countries are serious in their military development. Hence, the average of the 
results in the last columns of Tables 5.6 and 5.7 can be used as a single indicator of military 
importance. Alternatively, each of these two indicators can be assigned lower weight in the 
overall evaluation. 
 
2-4) Nuclear power status 
Nuclear power is usually considered as a great symbol of military power of a country. It 
might affect the position of a country in negotiations. Table 5.8 shows the nuclear power status 
of the five Caspian Sea countries. 
 
Table 5.8:  Nuclear power status 
Country Nuclear power status Out of 10 
Azerbaijan --------- 0 
Kazakhstan formerly possessing state 3 
Iran has uranium enrichment capability 3 
Russia nuclear weapons state 10 




http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/kazakhstan/index.html (Kazakhstan Special Weapons) 
 
The fall of the USSR left several former Soviet-bloc countries in possession of nuclear 
weapons. Kazakhstan inherited 1,400 nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, but transferred 
them all to Russia by 1995. Although Kazakhstan has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, this country must be taken into account as a state that is potentially capable to develop 
nuclear weapons. Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and says its interest in 
nuclear technology, including enrichment, is for civilian purposes only (a right guaranteed 
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under the treaty), but the Security Council of United Nations suspects that this is a cover for a 
nuclear weapons program. In fact, Iran does possesses Uranum enrichment capability which is 
considered a key stage in developing nuclear weapons. 
 
3) US Support 
The Caspian Sea region is economically and strategically important for all international 
powers. But more than EU or China, the US has the greatest interests and ambitions in this 
region. Because of its wealth, strength, and influence, the actions of the US affect other 
nations. One notable area is US foreign aid, which in reality is US financial support for its 
allied countries. Then funds support US geo-strategic interests and aim to achieve specific US 
foreign policy goals in countries of high priority from a strategic standpoint. For example, 
Israel receives huge financial support from the US because it is the most important ally of the 
US in the Middle East. 
Indicators: 
 
3-1) US Financial support 
The higher amount of US financial support for a country, the higher the US interest in that 
country. Such a country can rely on US political support. 
Table 5.9:  US Financial Support  




Out of 10 
Azerbaijan 38.782 37.355 35 111.137 10.54 6.83 
Kazakhstan 33.342 26.690 26 86.032 9.28 6.01 
Iran 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia 99.35 88 51 238.350 15.44 10 
Turkmenistan 5.7 6.505 5.5 17.705 4.21 2.73 
 
Source: http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ee/kz.html (Oct. 25, 07) 
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3-2) US Political support 
As discussed in the background section of the conflict, the newly independent countries 
believe that condominium regime causes political and economic domination of Russia and Iran 
over the Caspian Sea. Therefore, they are deeply interested in division of the Caspian Sea. This 
conform the US interests because the US plans to stop the hegemony of Iran and Russia in the 
region. That is why western-oriented political parties are supported by US to obtain the power 
in the newly independent countries. Table 5.10 represents to what extent the five Caspian Sea 
countries are politically supported by US. 
 
Table 5.10:  US Political Support 
Country US Attitude Out of 10 
Azerbaijan + + 10 
Kazakhstan + 8 
Iran - 0 
Russia 0 2 
Turkmenistan + 8 
 
The symbol + + in Table 5.10 means very great, + means positive, 0 means neutral and – 
indicates a negative attitude. All newly independent countries around the Caspian Sea are 
supported politically by US, but Azerbaijan possesses a greater strategic importance to the US. 
This country is located between Iran and Russia, and is a bridge between Asia and Europe. In 
spite of some mutual cooperation between the US and Russia, the US still considers Russia as 
one of its greatest opponents. That is why we indicate a politically neutral attitude to Russia, 
although the US financial support paid to Russia during the years 2004-2006 is the highest 
among those paid to the five Caspian Sea countries. 
 
 
4) Political Influence and Structure 
A higher internal stability a wider territory of political influence can strengthen the 





4-1) The Territory of Political Influence  
This indicator determines whether a country is a Local, Regional or an International power. 
In Table 5.11, the scores 0, 3, and 10 are assigned to a Local, Regional or an International 
power, respectively. 
 
Table 5.11: The Territory of Political Influence 
Country Political Influence Out of 10 
Azerbaijan Local 0 
Kazakhstan Local 0 
Iran Regional 3 
Russia International 10 




4-2) Democracy Level 
Democracy leads to the stability of a country in the long term. Table 5.12 shows to what 
extent the countries around the Caspian Sea are democratic according to the Economist 
Intelligence Unit democracy index 2006. The subcriteria are listed in the Table and the scores 




































0.79 3.33 3.75 5.59 
 
3.31 6.59 
Kazakhstan 2.67 2.14 
 





3.57 3.89 5.63 1.47 2.93 5.84 
Russia 7.00 
 





0.79 2.78 5.00 0.59 1.83 3.65 
 
Source: (Kekic 2007)  
http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007_v3.pdf (Oct. 31, 2007) 
 
We now summarize all results from Table 5.2 to Table 5.12 in Table 5.13 to evaluate the 
weight of each country involved in the Caspian Sea negotiations. 
 
Table 5.13:  Summary of Scores 
Country/Criteria 1-1 1-2 1-3 2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 3-1 3-2 4-1 4-2 
Azerbaijan 2.78 1.57 1.46 1.84 10 10 0 6.83 10 0 6.59 
Kazakhstan 6.57 7.07 1.88 0.83 2.29 2.81 3 6.01 8 0 7.2 
Iran 6.21 5.94 4.75 4.41 7.12 5.31 3 0 0 3 5.84 
Russia 10 7.3 10 10 7.71 5.56 10 10 2 10 10 




5.2.2 Using Data Envelopment Analysis to determine aggregate weights 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is an increasingly popular management decision tool 
initially proposed by Charnes et al. (1978). It is a linear programming based technique 
originally designed to measure the relative performance of a number of producers or decision 
making units, where the presence of multiple inputs and outputs makes comparisons difficult. 
During the last twenty years, a significant amount of research has focused on DEA for both 
theoretical extensions and practical applications. For example, Cook and Kress (1994) 
discussed relationships between DEA and MCDA and proposed a DEA-based MCDA method 
to handle both cardinal and ordinal criteria. 
To evaluate the weights of the decision makers (N-weights) in the negotiations over the 
Caspian Sea, we must determine the importance of each criterion. One method is to apply the 
DEA method to find the most favourable set of relative importance of different criteria (C-
weights) for each country. 
If a criterion affects the position of a country in the Caspian Sea negotiations very 
significantly, then we try to assign a higher weight (C-weight) to that criterion. If a criterion 
affects the position of a country in the negotiation only marginally, we assign a lower weight 
to that criterion. It is often difficult to find a set of generally accepted C-weights to aggregate 
the indices properly, which is a good reason to apply the DEA method. Based on the DEA 
concept, the C-weight of a criterion for a specific country could be different from the weight of 
that criterion for another country. However, the comparison is conducted in a fair manner by 
permitting a country to maximize its possibility of obtaining the best aggregate evaluation 
result (the highest N-weight). For example, we now maximize the total weight of Azerbaijan 
( Aw ) using the following linear program. Table 5-14 shows the C-weight variables associated 
with the described criteria. 
 
Table 5.14: The associated C-weight variables 
Criteria 1-1 1-2 1-3 2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 3-1 3-2 4-1 4-2 










We now summarize the assumptions and then show how these assumptions are 
implemented by the constraints of the linear program. Suppose that: 
• The N-weights of the countries are scaled out of 10. Hence, no N-weight can exceed 
10. (Inequations 1 to 5) 
• The sum of the all C-weights for each country is equal to 1. (Equation 6) 
• In addition, no C-weight could be selected as zero. In other words, N-weight of a 
country is affected by all described criteria. (Inequations 7 to 17) 
• The criteria 2-1 and 4-1 (the Yearly Military Expenditures and the Territory of 
Political Influence), associated with w4 and w10, are equally the most important 
criteria. (Equation 18 and Inequations 19 to 27) 
• The criterion 1-1 measuring GNI/capita is considered as the third important criterion. 
(Inequations 28 to 35) 
• After the mentioned priorities, the criteria 1-3, 2-4 and 3-1 are equally the most 
important criteria that affect the N-weight of a country. (Equation 36 and 37 and 





6.59*w11<=10;         (1) 
 
6.57*w1+7.07*w2+1.88*w3+0.83*w4+2.29*w5+2.81*w6+3*w7+6.01*w8+8*w9+0*w10+ 
7.2*w11<=10;         (2) 
 
6.21*w1+5.94*w2+4.75*w3+4.41*w4+7.12*w5+5.31*w6+3*w7+0*w8+0*w9+3*w10+ 
5.84*w11<=10;         (3) 
 
10*w1+7.3*w2+10*w3+10*w4+7.71*w5+5.56*w6+10*w7+10*w8+2*w9+10*w10+10*w11<=10;
           (4) 
 
3*w1+10*w2+0.86*w3+0.53*w4+3.95*w5+3.47*w6+0*w7+2.73*w8+8*w9+0*w10+3.65*w11 





w1+w2+w3+w4+w5+w6+w7+w8+w9+w10+w11=1;     (6) 
 
 
w1>0.001;          (7) 
w2>0.001;          (8) 
w3>0.001;          (9) 
w4>0.001;          (10) 
w5>0.001;          (11) 
w6>0.001;          (12) 
w7>0.001;          (13) 
w8>0.001;          (14) 
w9>0.001;          (15) 
w10>0.001;          (16) 
w11>0.001;          (17) 
 
 
w4=w10;          (18) 
 
w4-w1>=0.001;         (19) 
w4-w2>=0.001;         (20) 
w4-w3>=0.001;         (21) 
w4-w5>=0.001;         (22) 
w4-w6>=0.001;         (23) 
w4-w7>=0.001;         (24) 
w4-w8>=0.001;         (25) 
w4-w9>=0.001;         (26) 




w1-w2>=0.001;         (28) 
w1-w3>=0.001;         (29) 
w1-w5>=0.001;         (30) 
w1-w6>=0.001;         (31) 
w1-w7>=0.001;         (32) 
w1-w8>=0.001;         (33) 
w1-w9>=0.001;         (34) 




w3=w7;          (36) 
 
w3=w8;          (37) 
 
w3-w2>=0.001;         (38) 
w3-w5>=0.001;         (39) 
w3-w6>=0.001;         (40) 
w3-w9>=0.001;         (41) 







Solving the above linear program using the software LINGO, the value of objective 
function is Aw = 4.911540. Similarly, we maximize the N-weights of other countries by 
solving other linear programs with identical constraints and different objective functions. For 
example, the following objective function is applied to maximize the N-weight of Kazakhstan: 
Kw =6.57*w1+7.07*w2+1.88*w3+0.83*w4+2.29*w5+2.81*w6+3*w7+6.01*w8+8*w9+0*w10+
7.2*w11 
If we substitute the above objective function with the previous one (which was for 
Azerbaijan) and keep the previous constrains we determine Kw , N-weight of Kazakhstan to be 
Kw = 4.479700. Table 5.15 shows the N-weights of the countries based on DEA system. Each 
number in this table is the value of each objective function (N-weights) as the output data of 
the appropriate linear program.  
 
Table 5.15: N-weights of the countries as determined by DEA 








5.3 Applying the Model 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are five ways to resolve the legal status of the Caspian 
Sea, as follows: 
C: Condominium 
Dm: Division based on the International Law applying to Seas 
De: Equal Division: 20% of the sea, and the seabed, to each littoral state 
Ds: Division based on Soviet maps 
DC: Division of the seabed based on International Law, condominium on the surface 
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In Chapter 2, it was noted that each state has strict preferences over the five alternatives, 
based on assessments of their national economic, political and military interests. The states’ 
preferences are as follows:  
 
Azerbaijan       : s m eD D DC D C> > > >  
Iran  : e m sC D D DC D> > > >  
Kazakhstan     : s m eD D DC C D> > > >  
Russia : s m eC DC D D D> > > >  
Turkmenistan: e s mD D D DC C> > > >  
 
Other parameters of the model of the negotiation over the legal status of the Caspian Sea 
are shown in Table 5-16. The numbers in the Weight coulomb of this Table are the rounded N-
weights from Table 5.15. Acceptability and Fallback Distance of the five Caspian Sea states 
were defined in Chapter 3 and are supposed based on the historical background explained 
before. 
 
Table 5.16: Negotiation Parameters of the countries 
Country Weight Acceptability Fallback Distance 
Azerbaijan 4.91 2 1 
Iran 4.55  1 1 
Kazakhstan 4.48 2 1 
Russia 9.98 1 1 
Turkmenistan 3.26 3 1 
 
In the Caspian Sea negotiations, there are five decision makers and five alternatives, so the 
number of the negotiation states is 55 (2 1) 155× − =  
 We know that some bilateral treaties or multilateral agreements among some of the five 
states have already occurred since the collapse of the USSR. But these agreements may not 
endure, because the five presidents of the Caspian Sea states agreed, in their joint declaration 
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at the end of the Tehran meeting in October 2007, that the legal regime of the Caspian Sea 
should be determined unanimously. 
 
 
5.3.1 Verification of the proposed methodology  
In this section, we apply the proposed methodology to verify to what extent the model can 
predict the observed outcomes of the negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea. For 
this purpose, we suppose that the threshold for any alternative is equal to 19. (In other words, 
we let the model consider some non- unanimous agreements as feasible. However, no 
agreement without Russia’s support is considered feasible. All potential states are listed in 
Table 5.17, which also includes feasibility and stability status of the states when T = 19 for all 
alternatives. A feasible state is denoted by F and a stable state is indicated by S in this table. 
 
 







1 { }( , )C A    79 { }( , , , )sD A I K    
2 { }( , )mD A    80 { }(DC, , , )A I K    
3 { }( , )eD A    81 { }( , , , )C A I R  F S 
4 { }( , )sD A    82 { }( , , , )mD A I R  F  
5 { }(DC, )A    83 { }( , , , )eD A I R  F  
6 { }( , )C I    84 { }( , , , )sD A I R  F  
7 { }( , )mD I    85 { }(DC, , , )A I R  F S 
8 { }( , )eD I    86 { }( , , , )C A I T    
9 { }( , )sD I    87 { }( , , , )mD A I T    
10 { }(DC, )I    88 { }( , , , )eD A I T    
11 { }( , )C K    89 { }( , , , )sD A I T    
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12 { }( , )mD K    90 { }(DC, , , )A I T    
13 { }( , )eD K    91 { }( , , , )C A K R  F  
14 { }( , )sD K    92 { }( , , , )mD A K R  F  
15 { }(DC, )K    93 { }( , , , )eD A K R  F  
16 { }( , )C R    94 { }( , , , )sD A K R  F  
17 { }( , )mD R    95 { }(DC, , , )A K R  F S 
18 { }( , )eD R    96 { }( , , , )C A K T    
19 { }( , )sD R    97 { }( , , , )mD A K T    
20 { }(DC, )R    98 { }( , , , )eD A K T    
21 { }( , )C T    99 { }( , , , )sD A K T   S 
22 { }( , )mD T    100 { }(DC, , , )A K T    
23 { }( , )eD T   S 101 { }( , , , )C A R T    
24 { }( , )sD T    102 { }( , , , )mD A R T    
25 { }(DC, )T    103 { }( , , , )eD A R T    
26 { }( , , )C A I    104 { }( , , , )sD A R T    
27 { }( , , )mD A I    105 { }(DC, , , )A R T    
28 { }( , , )eD A I    106 { }( , , , )C I K R  F S 
29 { }( , , )sD A I    107 { }( , , , )mD I K R  F  
30 { }(DC, , )A I    108 { }( , , , )eD I K R  F  
31 { }( , , )C A K    109 { }( , , , )sD I K R  F  
32 { }( , , )mD A K    110 { }(DC, , , )I K R  F S 
33 { }( , , )eD A K    111 { }( , , , )C I K T    
34 { }( , , )sD A K    112 { }( , , , )mD I K T    
35 { }(DC, , )A K    113 { }( , , , )eD I K T    
36 { }( , , )C A R    114 { }( , , , )sD I K T    
37 { }( , , )mD A R    115 { }(DC, , , )I K T    
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38 { }( , , )eD A R    116 { }( , , , )C I R T   S 
39 { }( , , )sD A R    117 { }( , , , )mD I R T    
40 { }(DC, , )A R    118 { }( , , , )eD I R T    
41 { }( , , )C A T    119 { }( , , , )sD I R T    
42 { }( , , )mD A T    120 { }(DC, , , )I R T    
43 { }( , , )eD A T    121 { }( , , , )C K R T    
44 { }( , , )sD A T    122 { }( , , , )mD K R T    
45 { }(DC, , )A T    123 { }( , , , )eD K R T    
46 { }( , , )C I K    124 { }( , , , )sD K R T    
47 { }( , , )mD I K    125 { }(DC, , , )K R T    
48 { }( , , )eD I K    126 { }( , , , , )C A I K R  F S 
49 { }( , , )sD I K    127 { }( , , , , )mD A I K R  F  
50 { }(DC, , )I K    128 { }( , , , , )eD A I K R  F  
51 { }( , , )C I R   S 129 { }( , , , , )sD A I K R  F  
52 { }( , , )mD I R    130 { }(DC, , , , )A I K R  F S 
53 { }( , , )eD I R    131 { }( , , , , )C A I K T    
54 { }( , , )sD I R    132 { }( , , , , )mD A I K T    
55 { }(DC, , )I R    133 { }( , , , , )eD A I K T    
56 { }( , , )C I T    134 { }( , , , , )sD A I K T   S 
57 { }( , , )mD I T    135 { }(DC, , , , )A I K T    
58 { }( , , )eD I T    136 { }( , , , , )C A I R T  F S 
59 { }( , , )sD I T    137 { }( , , , , )mD A I R T  F  
60 { }(DC, , )I T    138 { }( , , , , )eD A I R T  F  
61 { }( , , )C K R    139 { }( , , , , )sD A I R T  F  
62 { }( , , )mD K R    140 { }(DC, , , , )A I R T  F S 
63 { }( , , )eD K R    141 { }( , , , , )C A K R T  F  
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64 { }( , , )sD K R    142 { }( , , , , )mD A K R T  F  
65 { }(DC, , )K R    143 { }( , , , , )eD A K R T  F  
66 { }( , , )C K T    144 { }( , , , , )sD A K R T  F S 
67 { }( , , )mD K T    145 { }(DC, , , , )A K R T  F S 
68 { }( , , )eD K T    146 { }( , , , , )C I K R T  F S 
69 { }( , , )sD K T    147 { }( , , , , )mD I K R T  F  
70 { }(DC, , )K T    148 { }( , , , , )eD I K R T  F  
71 { }( , , )C R T    149 { }( , , , , )sD I K R T  F  
72 { }( , , )mD R T    150 { }(DC, , , , )I K R T  F S 
73 { }( , , )eD R T    151 { }( , , , , , )C A I K R T  F S 
74 { }( , , )sD R T    152 { }( , , , , , )mD A I K R T  F  
75 { }(DC, , )R T    153 { }( , , , , , )eD A I K R T  F  
76 { }( , , , )C A I K    154 { }( , , , , , )sD A I K R T  F S 
77 { }( , , , )mD A I K    155 { }(DC, , , , , )A I K R T F S 
78 { }( , , , )eD A I K        
 
 
As discussed in the background of the conflict, the main point of disagreement among the five 
littoral states after the collapse of the USSR in 1991 was that the newly independent states, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, preferred exclusive economic zones by division of 
the Caspian Sea, while Iran and Russia, which possess other economic resources, favoured the 
“condominium regime”.  As shown in Table 5.18, both of the states { }( , , )C I R  and 
{ }( , , , )sD A K T  are stable but infeasible under the T = 19 assumption. In negotiations between 
1991 and 1997, stability with infeasibility can be interpreted as a case of deadlock. Generally, 
stable but infeasible states cause impasse in the negotiation process because infeasibility 
implies that the coalition associated with the state is not strong enough to enforce an 




Table 5.18: Caspian Sea Model verification 
Time Initial State Feasibility Stability Result 
After the collapse of 
USSR in 1991 
{ }( , , )C I R  Infeasible Stable Deadlock 
{ }( , , , )sD A K T  Infeasible Stable Deadlock 
1997 { }(DC, )R  Infeasible Unstable Movement 
 
 
The deadlock was relaxed in 1997 when Russia changed its priorities, in an apparent effort 
to become more pragmatic and constructive. It suggested that the two historical treaties with 
Iran (dating from 1921 and 1941) were still valid, implying that the surface of the Caspian Sea 
should be administered as a condominium. At the same time, it argued that the seabed should 
be divided among the five littoral states according to the modified median line method. As 
Table 5-18 indicates, the state { }(DC, )R  is not stable; there are some movements away from it. 
Using the Negotiation Support System explained in Chapter 4, we trace all movements from 
the initial state { }(DC, )R , in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
    { }( , )C R    { }( , , )C I R    
  
{ }(DC, )R    { }( , , , )sD A K R   
 
 
{ }( , , , , )sD A K R T  
 
Figure 5.1: The tree of possible outcomes from { }(DC, )R  
 
SD - Likely  
SD - Possible 
AG - Likely  
AG - Likely  
PI - Possible 
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As illustrated by Figure 5-1, which continues to assume T = 19, it is likely that Russia will 
support the ultimate division of the Caspian Sea. The reality matches this prediction. On May 
14, 2003, a multilateral agreement on the dividing lines of the Caspian seabed was signed by 
the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation. Iran is 
very concerned that Turkmenistan may join this agreement, which would weaken Iran’s 
position very much. Iran demanded that the Sea be divided equally, motivating Turkmenistan 
not to accept DC or SD , since equal division of the Caspian Sea is the best alternative for 
Turkmenistan. Since there is no significant contrast between what the model describes as the 
most likely outcomes of the previous negotiations and what happened in reality, we interpret 
the negotiation model as verified. 
 
5.3.2 Prediction of the outcomes of the Caspian Sea negotiations  
We now apply the proposed methodology to predict the most likely outcomes of the 
continuing Caspian Sea negotiations. We mentioned that the five Caspian Sea states have 
agreed that the legal regime of the Caspian Sea should be determined unanimously. Therefore, 
it is reasonable that the threshold of all alternatives be set at T= 27 instead of T= 19 in the 
negotiation support system described in Chapter 4. In this case, only unanimous agreements 
over the five alternatives are feasible. Taking other parameters of the negotiation as identical 
to those referred in Table 5.16, the stable states of this negotiation are as shown in Table 5.19. 












Table 5.19: Stable states of the Caspian Sea negotiations 
State ID State Feasibility State ID State Feasibility 
23 { }( , )eD T   118 { }( , , , )eD I R T   
40 { }(DC, , )A R   123 { }( , , , )eD K R T   
43 { }( , , )eD A T   125 { }(DC, , , )K R T   
51 { }( , , )C I R   126 { }( , , , , )C A I K R   
58 { }( , , )eD I T   132 { }( , , , , )mD A I K T   
65 { }(DC, , )K R   133 { }( , , , , )eD A I K T   
68 { }( , , )eD K T   134 { }( , , , , )sD A I K T   
73 { }( , , )eD R T   136 { }( , , , , )C A I R T   
75 { }(DC, , )R T   138 { }( , , , , )eD A I R T   
81 { }( , , , )C A I R   143 { }( , , , , )eD A K R T   
88 { }( , , , )eD A I T   144 { }( , , , , )sD A K R T   
95 { }(DC, , , )A K R   145 { }(DC, , , , )A K R T   
98 { }( , , , )eD A K T   146 { }( , , , , )C I K R T   
99 { }( , , , )sD A K T   148 { }( , , , , )eD I K R T   
103 { }( , , , )eD A R T   151 { }( , , , , , )C A I K R T  F 
105 { }(DC, , , )A R T   152 { }( , , , , , )mD A I K R T  F 
106 { }( , , , )C I K R   153 { }( , , , , , )eD A I K R T  F 
113 { }( , , , )eD I K T   154 { }( , , , , , )sD A I K R T  F 
116 { }( , , , )C I R T   155 { }(DC, , , , , )A I K R T  F 
 
The final conclusions indicate that among the five unanimous agreements, state 
{ }( , , , , , )mD A I K R T  is the most likely enduring legal status of the Caspian Sea, and 
{ }( , , , , , )sD A I K R T  is second most likely. Figure 5.2 shows different ways that the first outcome, 
{ }( , , , , , )mD A I K R T , unanimous agreement over the division of the Caspian Sea based on 
International Law applying to Seas, might evolve. 
 108
 
      { }( , , )mD I R  
     { }( , , )eD I R  
     { }( , , )sD I R  
     { }( , , , )mD A I R  
 { }( , , , )eD A I R  
 { }( , , , )sD A I R  
   { }( , , , )mD I K R       
    { }( , , , )eD I K R       
    { }( , , , )sD I K R  
 { }( , , , )mD I R T    { }( , , , , , )mD A I K R T      
     { }( , , , )sD I R T  
     { }( , , , , )mD A I K R  
     { }( , , , , )eD A I K R  
     { }( , , , , )sD A I K R  
 { }( , , , , )mD A I R T  
 { }( , , , , )sD A I R T  
 { }( , , , , )mD I K R T  
{ }( , , , , )sD I K R T  
 
Figure 5.2: Different paths to unanimous agreement on division of the Caspian Sea based on 





































































































5.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis of the Caspian Sea negotiation model 
At the beginning of Section 5.3, we referred to the states’ preferences. Those strict 
preferences over the five alternatives were estimated based on assessments of the states’ 
national economic, political and military interests. If we suppose that the states are much more 
concerned about economic rather than political or military issues, then their preferences are 
slightly changed, as follows: 
 
Azerbaijan       : s m eD D DC D C> > > >  
Iran  : e m sC D D DC D> > > >  
Kazakhstan     : s m eD D DC C D= > > >  
Russia : s m eC DC D D D> > = >  
Turkmenistan: e s mD D D DC C> > > >  
 
Under the new circumstances, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan no longer consider mD  to be 
an acceptable alternative because, unlike Kazakhstan and Russia, these two states own a 
greater share of the Caspian Sea under sD compared with mD . In other words, the only 
acceptable alternative for Azerbaijan is sD , and for Turkmenistan sD  or eD . Other parameters 
of the negotiation in this sensitivity analysis are exactly identical to those in Section 5.3.2. 
Applying the proposed negotiation support system produces more stable states. Table 5-20 
shows the new stable states in this sensitivity analysis. Note that all stable states shown in 








Table 5.20: New stable states in the sensitivity analysis of the Caspian Sea negotiation model 
 
State ID State State ID State 
12 { }( , )mD K  107 { }( , , , )mD I K R  
47 { }( , , )mD I K  112 { }( , , , )mD I K T  
62 { }( , , )mD K R  127 { }( , , , , )mD A I K R  
77 { }( , , , )mD A I K  147 { }( , , , , )mD I K R T  
 
 
As the results show, the change in priorities for the countries from political issues to economic 
issues increases the number of stable states. More specifically, the number of agglomeration 
movements and strategic disimprovements decreases due to the reduction in acceptable 
alternatives for Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. In particular, state { }( , , , , , )mD A I K R T  is less 
likely to appear as the outcome, compared with the previous analysis in Section 5.3.2. Among 
the five unanimous agreements, state { }( , , , , , )sD A I K R T  is most likely as the enduring legal 
status of the Caspian Sea. However, sD  and mD  are not too far from each other (see Table 
2.7) as both indicate similar divisions of the Caspian Sea. Figure 5-3 shows different ways that 
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Figure 5.3: Sensitivity analysis for Caspian Sea negotiations - 



























































5.4 Conclusions and Summary 
The methodology proposed in chapter 4 is applied in this chapter to model and analyse 
multilateral negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea. The notion of power is 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter. Since the weights of the DMs are not clearly 
stipulated in the Caspian Sea negotiations, they are estimated based on the capability of the 
DMs in the negotiation process. To measure DMs’ weights quantitatively, 11 criteria that can 
be considered to be important determinants of countries’ capabilities in Caspian Sea 
negotiations are discussed, evaluated, and integrated using a Multi Criteria Decision Analysis 
model, and the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method that finds the most favourable set 
of relative importance of different criteria for each country is applied. 
A model of Caspian Sea negotiations is applied to verify to what extent the proposed 
methodology can predict the observed outcomes of the negotiations over the legal status of the 
Caspian Sea. Since there is no significant contrast between what the model describes as the 
most likely outcomes of the previous negotiations and what happened in reality, the 
negotiation model can be interpreted as verified.  
The proposed methodology is applied in Chapter 5 to predict the most likely outcomes of 
the continuing Caspian Sea negotiations. The final conclusions indicate that unanimous 
agreements over the division of the Caspian Sea are the most likely outcomes that can be 
predicted as the enduring legal status of the Caspian Sea. The results of sensitivity analysis 













Chapter 6  
 




In this Chapter, the methodology proposed in Chapter 3 is applied to actual negotiations over 
the redevelopment of a brownfield project at the Epton site located in Kitchener, Ontario, 
Canada. The objective is to ensure that the new methodology is flexible enough to model more 
real-world cases. Moreover, we want to test how well the actual outcomes of the real world 
negotiations match the most likely outcomes identified by the methodology. We start with a 
general introduction to brownfield redevelopment projects, then we chronicle the history of the 
Epton site, and finally we model and analyze the negotiations over the redevelopment of this 
site. 
Brownfields are defined by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) 
as abandoned or idled properties that are contaminated or potentially contaminated as a 
consequence of previous usage. They are both a problem and a point of interest for urban 
centers around the world (USEPA, 1997). Brownfields vary in size, location, age and past use, 
and can range from abandoned corner gas stations to large, multi-acre former manufacturing 
plants that have been closed for years. (The Community Environmental Resource Program, 
2008) 
Although brownfields are sometimes associated with reduced human health and 
environmental quality and with increased crime rates, and may be seen by developers, citizens 
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and local governments as carrying a stigma, their redevelopment provides opportunities to 
reduce urban sprawl, improve human health and environmental conditions, and increase tax 
revenue for the local government (Greenberg, et al., 1998; DeSousa, 2003). Many parties have 
interests in the environmental, social and economic impacts of brownfield redevelopment 
projects. Dair and Williams (2006), De Sousa (2003; 2000) and Greenberg et al (1998; 2000) 
all conclude that the key decision makers are private and public developers; federal, regional 
and local government agencies; and community groups.  
We now focus on a specific brownfield redevelopment project, the Epton site. After 
recounting the history of this property, we model and analyze multilateral negotiations over its 
redevelopment.   
 
6.2 History of the Epton Site 
The property known as the ‘Epton site’ is located on approximately three hectares at the edge 
of the business district in Kitchener, Ontario, Canada. At the time it was closed, in 1996, it 
included five buildings with a total floor area of nearly 46,000 square meters. The oldest 
buildings dated from 1919, with additions through 1957. The site was used for the 
manufacturing of plastic and rubber products (Larson, 2008). 
The plant was owned and operated by B.F. Goodrich Canada Inc. (a subsidiary of The B.F 
Goodrich Company, a US corporation) until 1983, at which time the property was sold to 
Epton Industries Limited. As a part of the transaction, Goodrich Canada indemnified Epton for 
certain claims that could arise out of environmental contamination that may have occurred 
prior to 1983. In 1993, Goodrich (USA) spun off its Geon Vinyl Division as an independent 
publicly-traded Corporation, The Geon Company. Geon Canada Inc., a wholly owned 
subsidiary of The Geon Company, the successor of Goodrich Canada, including the Epton 
property. In 2000, The Geon Company became the PolyOne Corporation and Geon Canada 
was renamed PolyOne Canada. The following is a timeline representing the history of Epton 
site from 1994 until the present. 
 
April 1994 
Bill Thomson, President of Epton, demanded that Geon accept responsibility for 
environmental contamination at the Epton site, based upon the indemnifications given to Epton 
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by Goodrich in the 1983 sale. Geon had no obligation to agree to Epton’s demand, inasmuch 
as the indemnification (as acknowledged by Epton), would apply only if there were a 
government order, for example from the Ontario Ministry of the Environment (MOE), to 
remediate or compensate for environmental damage. At the time, no such action had been 
taken, or even threatened. Other reasons why Geon could have resisted Epton’s demand 
included the less-than-definitive wording and the fact that “after the sale” Epton had probably 
contributed substantially to the contamination, thus voiding the indemnification. Nevertheless, 
in light of Epton’s precarious financial situation, Geon believed that, there was a strong 
possibility that the MOE would step in and order remedial action, as might be inevitable in the 
event of bankruptcy, and therefore denied not to force the issue. Usually, remediation is less 
costly and less complicated if it is undertaken voluntarily. 
 Geon sent Bill Thompson a letter containing a proposed ‘standstill’ agreement. Under the 
terms of the agreement, the two parties would hire a consultant to conduct a remedial 
investigation at the site and even begin actual remediation, if indicated. The parties would 
direct the consultant by consensus, with no formal direction or work plan, and would split the 
costs 50-50, with the understanding that the costs could (retroactively) be reallocated 
sometime in the future, by agreement, litigation, or otherwise.  The agreement could be 
revoked by either party at any time, and each party reserved any claims or defenses. The 
agreement was simple and notably lacking in legalese, relying instead upon the common 
interest of both parties to address the environmental issues without acknowledging or 
commiting to any specific responsibility or outcome. Thomson signed a copy of the letter and 
sent it back without any changes. Shortly thereafter, Epton and Geon retained CH2M Gore & 
Storrie (‘CG&S’, an environmental consultant now named CH2M Hill) to perform the 
remedial investigation. “Geon and Epton advised officials of the MOE that an environmental 
investigation was taking place and kept the agency apprised of those activities. Significant soil 
and groundwater contamination was found. After notifying Epton, Geon asked CG&S to start 
pumping the contaminant out through the monitoring well” (Larson, 2008).  
August 1995 
Epton was deemed to be bankrupt, and ceased manufacturing operations (except for 
limited production undertaken by the Trustee in Bankruptcy on behalf of General Motors). 
This presented several problems for Geon and the Epton site remediation plan. 
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First, the joint support for the remediation program came to an end. In order to continue 
the work, Geon agreed to continue the investigation and preliminary remediation activities on 
a voluntary basis and to pay 100 percent of the consultant’s fees, pending further resolution of 
issues in bankruptcy proceedings. Geon also agreed to reimburse CG&S for Epton’s unpaid 
invoices.  
Second, when Epton went into receivership, potential liability for the environmental 
conditions at the site fell upon numerous other parties, including prior property owners 
(including Goodrich/Geon), the Trustee itself, secured creditors, certain interim operators, and 
others associated with plant operations over the years. Bill Thomson (Epton), Ted Pollock 
(CG&S), and Lee Larson (Geon) met regarding the bankruptcy filing. All agreed that Geon 
was responsible for about 80 percent of the contamination at the site, and Epton about 20 
percent. An important aspect of their agreement is that it not only postponed negotiations over 
allocation of responsibility, but also provided a mechanism to assist the parties to reach 
eventual agreement on financial responsibility.  
Geon wanted to avoid litigation for at least three reasons. First, the transactional (litigation) 
costs would likely be enormous, considering the complexity of the issues and the number of 
parties to the litigation and their disparity. Second, as is customary in environmental liability 
cases, the remediation would probably be carried out (after an apportionment of liability) by a 
committee or organization composed of all the potentially liable parties, a notoriously 
wasteful, cumbersome, and ineffective process. And, third, any remediation program would be 
overseen by the MOE, which could increase costs exponentially and delay completion by 
years.  
Accordingly, Geon proposed an agreement among it, the Trustee, and the creditors that 
would (1) allow Geon access to the property to continue its remediation program (on a 
voluntary basis), (2) grant Geon a lien on the property for its remediation costs, (3) grant to 
Geon an option to purchase the property (for one dollar), (4) insulate Geon from some possible 
claims, and (5) vacate all liens and mortgages on the property.  In return, Geon would forego 
all claims against the other parties, including the Trustee, for past and future cleanup costs and 
indemnify them against any environmental claims. 
A month after the bankruptcy filing, the Trustee and all creditors but one formally accepted 
Geon’s proposal, without significant changes, and executed an agreement, the Geon Canada 
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Remediation Access Agreement. Geon Canada's environmental investigation and remediation 
efforts were not delayed by the Epton bankruptcy. Geon had submitted the results of its 
preliminary (Phase I) studies to the MOE in July, 1995 and met with the Ministry in August to 
discuss the status of the investigation and remediation project. Later in the month, the Ontario 
Court of Justice agreed that the property had no value and authorized the Trustee to abandon it, 
subject to completion of its duties it had agreed to, including these given in the Remediation 
Access Agreement.  
 
November 1995 
In November, the bankruptcy Trustee wrote to the City of Kitchener and Regional 
Municipality of Waterloo, informing them that the buildings would be stripped, the utilities 
and fire protection would be terminated, and the site would be abandoned. The Trustee offered 
custody (and, presumably, ownership) of the site to the City or Region, but both declined. As 
Geon continued its environmental investigation and remediation program, the Trustee 
proceeded to cannibalize the 500,000 square feet of buildings on the property, removing the 
fixtures, plumbing, wiring, machinery, HVAC systems, scrap metal, etc. By early 1996 the 
buildings were gutted, windowless eyesores.  
 
January 1996 
On January 30, 1996, the Court granted Geon access to the property for the purpose of 
remediation, superseding the Trustee’s abandonment of the property and ultimate discharge. 
The Court also granted a lien against the property in favor of Geon for past and future 
remediation costs. 
The City of Kitchener became increasingly concerned about the extreme fire and safety 
hazard presented by the gutted and abandoned buildings. Because of the Trustee’s 
abandonment of the property, the City could not acquire title, and abate the hazards, quickly. 
Moreover, acquisition of title would expose the City to substantial environmental liability, and 
the estimated cost to the City to demolish and remove the buildings would exceed $1.5 
million. The City urged Geon to exercise its option, purchase the property, and abate the 
hazards. 
 118
During 1995 and 1996, representatives of Geon met with the City to discuss the status of 
the property. The City had liens of over $1 million on the property, including arrears of realty 
taxes (which were continuing to accrue) and unpaid electricity charges. The City was 
extremely concerned because it believed that, if the site were abandoned, it would be left to 
deal with the practical problems that would inevitably arise. The City also feared that it would 
not be able to recover back taxes, and advanced proposals involving a tax write-off to 
encourage a private party to demolish the building and develop the property.  
The City's long-term objective was to make the property available for future use so that it 
would contribute positively to the community and generate tax revenue. The reaction of Geon 
to the idea of taking title to a contaminated factory was understandably cool, but it eventually 
agreed. Geon made a simple proposal: Geon would exercise its option to purchase the property 
and demolish the buildings by October 31, 1997, if the City would forgive past and ongoing 
real estate taxes (and other charges) up to that date. 
 
September 1996 
On September 16, 1996 the Kitchener City Council passed a resolution authorizing the 
write-off of past and future realty taxes if Geon Canada (or a subsidiary) spent the equivalent 
amount, or less to demolish the buildings and clear the property. Shortly thereafter, the 
Kitchener-Wilmot Hydro Commission wrote off the electricity charges relating to the property. 
The total of the write-off, was approximately $1.2 million.  
On September 26, 1996 a new Canadian corporation, LP Holdings Inc. ("LPH"), was 
incorporated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Geon Canada. The articles of incorporation of 
LPH limit its objects to acquiring the Epton property, securing and demolishing the buildings, 
preparing the property for lease or sale, leasing and selling the property, and anything 
reasonably incidental to the foregoing. The articles also provide that, in all matters, due regard 
must be paid to the interests and input of the Kitchener-Waterloo community.  
LPH has two directors, one a PolyOne Canada (at that time, Geon Canada) employee and 
the other an independent resident of Waterloo, Ontario. LPH is committed to dispose of the 
property (by donation or sale) for public use or for other purposes serving the community’s 
interest. To guarantee this commitment, LPH’s charter grants to the City of Kitchener the 
power to appoint a third (and controlling) director to the LPH Board. Thus, Geon cannot 
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control LPH or its activities, and, if necessary to protect the public interest, the City and the 
independent director can together take control of LPH.  
On September 27, Geon (Canada) and LPH agreed that Geon would assign to LPH its 
option to purchase the property. Under the terms of the LPH/Geon agreement, Geon agreed to 
indemnify LPH for historic remediation costs. On its part, LPH agreed that Geon would have 
access to the Epton site for environmental investigation and remediation, that Geon’s cleanup 
need only to satisfy industrial standards (as determined by Geon), that Geon would be 
indemnified against future contamination charges, that the property  would not be used, leased 
or sold for a purpose inconsistent with Geon's remediation program, and that Geon would be 
reimbursed for cleanup costs if the proceeds of any future sale exceed LPH's costs of operation 
and building demolition.  
 
October 1996 
LPH obtained the necessary court order on October 16th, and began the demolition process 
the next morning. In October, LPH arranged for the cleanup of trash and debris and solicited 
bids for Phase 1 of the rehabilitation (plant demolition) project. Phase 1 included demolition of 
the water tower and three smaller buildings, which presented the greatest safety hazards.  
Thereafter, Phase 2 would include the demolition of the main building and the grading, 
seeding, and preparation of the vacant land for commercial disposition. LPH submitted an 
Extended Phase II (environmental remediation) report to MOE and requested a meeting in 
December. It also met with leaders to discuss the status and future uses of the property. 
 
December 1996 
On December 3, 1996, city officials, the MOE, and the general public attended an 
informational meeting held in Kitchener, at which representatives from LPH, Geon Canada, 
and CG&S, described in detail the environmental problems at the site, outlined remediation 
and rehabilitation plans, and answered questions. Geon disclosed that investigations to date 
had discovered soil and groundwater contamination, including naphtha and TCE, but 
confirmed that this contamination posed no danger to public health or safety. “Since 
December, 1994 onsite groundwater remediation had already resulted in substantial 
contaminant plume containment and significant improvement of the groundwater quality, but 
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much remained to be done. Both LPH and Geon committed to make all environmental 
information available to the general public” (Larson, 2008). 
The Phase 1 rehabilitation project was completed and draft bid specifications for the Phase 
2 rehabilitation were released. Geon met with the MOE to review the Extended Phase II 
environmental report and discuss alternatives. 
 
October 1997 
Phase 2 was completed in October, 1997. The adverse public reaction normally associated 
with such a project was avoided by the inclusion of community input. LPH explored 
alternatives for the ultimate use of the property with community organizations. A group of 
citizens responded with a proposal to use the property as a site for an Olympic class aquatic 
sports center, which would benefit Kitchener-Waterloo, Ontario, and Canada. An ad hoc 
committee was formed to develop the concept, the Poseidon Project. The committee proposed 
to build a pool complex for four major aquatic sports, a wellness center, and athletic housing. 
LPH offered to donate the Epton property for that purpose, and worked with the Poseidon 
Committee to bring the concept to fruition. Neither LPH nor Geon would have received any 
economic benefit from the project. 
While the Poseidon Project was being developed, LPH offered temporary use of the 
property to the City for purposes commensurate with the remediation activities at the site. The 
City used part of the property for public parking and undertook a beautification project along 
the King Street border. In April, 1999, the Poseidon Project received a boost when the City of 
Kitchener appropriated $130,000 to retain professional assistance for development of the 
project, the total cost of which was estimated at $60 to $80 million. 
 
January 2001 
 In January, 2001, the completed architectural, financing, and business plans were 
presented to the City of Kitchener for approval. However, City Council declined to approve a 
$15 million capital contribution necessary to fund the project, primarily for political reasons, 
and the Poseidon Project had to be abandoned. LPH invited the City to identify other public or 




The City was experiencing a severe shortage of parking in the area, and inquired about 
using the Epton site property for that purpose. To develop a parking lot, LPH and the City 
executed a three-year lease for the City on most of the property. LPH charged no rent and, the 
City agreed to maintain the property, and cover property taxes, and other expenses. The lease 
is still in effect, although the parking lot structures have since been removed. 
 
March 2006 
The City and the University of Waterloo identified the property as a potential site for a new 
Health Science Campus for the University, comprised of a pharmacy, satellite, medical school 
and clinics. A formal agreement was reached by the City of Kitchener and LPH for LPH to 
transfer title of the property to the City. The transfer was in stages, with the timing determined 
by minor remediation activities and Ministry approval.  
 
October 2008 (the present time) 
The parties (LPH, the City of Kitchener, and the University of Waterloo) are cooperating 
to obtain the environmental approvals necessary to effect the final transfer of the property to 
the City and, ultimately, the University. The pharmacy building is almost completed. 
 
































Figure 6.1 – Timetable diagram for the history of Epton site 
 
Epton Industries Limited buys Epton property from B.F. Goodrich Canada Inc. 
Geon Canada succeeds to Goodrich Canada’s interest in Epton property. 
City Council declines to approve a $15 M capital contribution to the sport complex.
Phase 2 of rehabilitation project is complete. LPH offers to donate the property. 
LPH confirms that the contamination at the site poses no danger to public health.
LPH begins the demolition process and arranges for cleanup of trash and debris. 
LPH is incorporated as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Geon Canada. 
The City Council authorizes the write-off of taxes if Geon demolishes and clears. 
The Court grants Geon a lien and access to the property for the process of remediation. 
Epton demands that Geon accept responsibility for contamination at the site. 
Epton becomes bankrupt and ceases most manufacturing operations. 
The Court agrees that Epton site has no value and authorizes Trustee to abandon it. 

















LPH informs the City that the property can be used as a parking lot.  
The City and UW determine that the property is appropriate for a new pharmacy school.
LPH, the City, and UW are work together to obtain the environmental approvals.
 123
 
6.3 Modeling Negotiations over the Redevelopment of the Epton 
Site 
Now we identify the most likely outcome of negotiations over the ultimate use of the property 
using the proposed methodology. The model covers mainly the redevelopment of the Epton 
site. 
 
6.3.1 Decision makers and alternatives 
Based on the timeline presented above, the following DMs are included in the model of 
negotiations over the Epton site. 
1) LPH 
2) City of Kitchener 
3) University of Waterloo 
 
It may be argued by some that the citizens of Kitchener should be considered as the fourth DM 
because they may have independent interests and preferences. We do not consider the public to 
be an independent DM for the following reasons: 
• The Public is not directly involved in negotiations among LPH, City of Kitchener 
and the University of Waterloo. Moreover, its interests are indirectly reflected in 
the decisions of the City of Kitchener, which is influenced by City Council whose 
members are elected. In other words, we assume that the possibility of improved 
service to citizens is a criterion in the City’s decision making. 
• Different citizens may have different preferences over the alternatives. For 
example, citizens may not agree as to whether or not parking is preferable to 
building a Sports Complex. It is the responsibility of the City Council to integrate 
the interests of the citizens. 
 
It may also be suggested that the MOE should be considered as another DM. However, 
MOE is not directly involved in negotiations among LPH, City of Kitchener and the 
University of Waterloo. As long as the remediation meets its standards, MOE’s role is not to 
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prescribe any specific ultimate use for the site. Of course, different applications may need 
different levels of remediation, as determined by MOE (Gray, 2008). We now list all possible 
alternatives as the use of the site. 
 
A: Do nothing 
This alternative means leaving a vacant building with outstanding taxes and utility bills 
which would continue to accumulate from the previous owner, Epton. LPH would be 
responsible for remediation. According to the Adverse Affect rule, if there is a possibility of 
contaminating adjacent property, then the owner can be held accountable to remedy any 
environmental impacts. 
   
B: Make the site safe  
This alternative means that the city would undertake the removal of hazards, and LPH 
would demolish the building and level the site. But there would be no underground 
remediation, though the site would be safe for the public in accordance with health and safety 
standard, potentially permitting redevelopment. 
 
C: Parking Lot 
According to this alternative, the city forgives outstanding utility bills and taxes, while 
LPH pays for demolition and makes the site safe. The city then would develop a parking lot.  
 
D: Sport Complex 
In this alternative, the city forgives utility bills and outstanding taxes, while LPH pays for 
demolition and makes the site safe. Then, the city develops a sports complex on the site. 
 
E: School of Pharmacy 
According to this alternative, the city forgives utility bills and outstanding taxes, while 
LPH pays for demolition and makes the site safe. Then, the University of Waterloo builds a 




6.3.2 Ordinal preferences of decision makers over the alternatives 
In this stage, we model the ordinal preferences of DMs over the specified alternatives. Table 
6.1 lists the criteria Cost, Public Image, and Revenue that determine LHP’s preferences over 
the five alternatives. For this DM, the weights of the criteria are assumed to be equal 3, 2, and 
1, respectively. Cost includes taxes, utilities, site remediation, demolition, redevelopment, and 
ongoing expenses of property ownership. Public Image reflects environmental stewardship and 
public benefit increasing reputation and possibly leading to future contracts. Revenue means 
value added to the redeveloped site, including income, for LHP. The performance of each 
alternative for each criterion is quantified by a utility value between 0 and 10. 
 
Table 6.1: The importance and performance of each criterion for LPH 
LPH 
Cost Public Image Revenue Overall 
Evaluation 
Ordinal 
Preference3 2 1 
A: Do nothing 10 0 0 30 2 
B: Make the site safe 8 2 0 28 4 
C: Parking lot 7 4 3 32 1 
D: Sport Complex 4 6 0 24 5 
E: School of Pharmacy 4 9 0 30 2 
Ideal Overall Evaluation 60  
 
The utility values in Table 6.1 can be justified as follows: 
• Under alternative B, LPH spends money just for demolition.  
• Under alternative C, LPH spends money for both demolition and remediation. On the 
other hand, with a parking lot, there will be revenue for LPH. LPH and the City signed 
a three-year lease, under which the City could use the majority of the property to build 
a parking lot. LPH charged no rent and, in return, the City agreed to maintain the 
property, pay the real estate taxes, and establish a fund to pay certain other expenses 
related to property ownership. The City benefited from the use of the property and 
LPH was relieved of much of the ongoing expense of property ownership. 
• Alternatives D and E may have a greater remediation cost.  
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Table 6.2 shows Cost, Public Benefit, and Revenue as the three criteria that determine the 
preferences of the City of Kitchener over the five alternatives. For this DM, the weights of the 
criteria are 2, 3, and 1, respectively. Cost includes initial capital investment and annual 
operating cost. Public Benefit indicates community benefits and respect for environmental 
liabilities. Revenue consists of potential taxes generated, and other possible income, for the 
City of Kitchener. 
 
Table 6.2: The importance and performance of each criterion for City of Kitchener 
City of Kitchener 
Cost Public Benefit Revenue Overall 
Evaluation 
Ordinal 
Preference2 3 1 
A: Do nothing 8 0 0 16 5 
B: Make the site safe 6 3 2 23 4 
C: Parking lot 5 6 4 32 2 
D: Sport Complex 3 7 2 29 3 
E: School of Pharmacy 3 9 2 35 1 
Ideal Overall Evaluation 60  
 
The utility values in Table 6.2 can be justified as follows: 
• Under alternative A, the City of Kitchener has no significant cost. However, it receives 
no compensation for unpaid tax or utility bills on the property. 
• Under alternative B, the City of Kitchener would undertake the removal of hazards. If 
the site is redeveloped, the City would receive tax revenue in the future.  
• Under alternative C, the City of Kitchener pays for the development of a parking lot, 
maintains the property, and pays the real estate taxes. On the other hand, the parking 
lot generates income for the City. 
• Under alternative E, the City of Kitchener transferred $30 million to the University of 
Waterloo for development of the School of Pharmacy through, the economic 
development investment fund. This alternative generates substantial revenue for the 
City as it receives a flat rate in liew of taxes. 
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Table 6.3 shows Cost, Public Service, and Revenue as the three criteria that determine the 
preferences of the University of Waterloo over the five alternatives. For this DM, the weights 
of the mentioned criteria are 1, 3, and 1, respectively. Cost includes initial development cost 
and annual operating cost. The utility value of cost for alternative E is considered 7, reflecting 
the $30 million received by the University of Waterloo from the City (Witmer, 2008). 
 
 




Cost Public Service Revenue Overall 
Evaluation 
Ordinal 
Preference1 3 1 
A: Do nothing 10 0 0 10 5 
B: Make the site safe 10 1 0 13 2 
C: Parking 10 1 0 13 2 
D: Sport Complex 10 1 0 13 2 
E: School of Pharmacy 7 10 4 41 1 




Based on the results shown in the last columns of the Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, the ordinal 
preferences of DMs over the proposed alternatives are as follow: 
• LPH:     C E A B D∼  
• City of Kitchener:   E C D B A  
• University of Waterloo: E B C D A∼ ∼  
The acceptable alternatives according to each DM are specified in Table 6.4, assuming that 
each DM accepts those alternatives for which their overall evaluations meet at least half of the 





Table 6.4: The acceptable alternatives for each DM 
Decision Maker The acceptable alternatives 
LPH C, E, and A 
City of Kitchener E and C 
University of Waterloo E 
 
As an exercise, in Appendix A, we estimate each DM’s weight in the decision making 
process which is important if the threshold of feasibility is something other than consensus. 
 
6.4 Analysis 
We start from the initial state, determine all possible movements and their associated 
likelihoods, and then trace the subsequent states to identify the most likely outcome according 
to the proposed methodology, explained in Chapter 3. The status quo considered in this 
analysis is state supporting B in which both LPH and the City of Kitchener agree to make the 
site safe. This was the actual situation in September 1996. Figure 6.2 shows all possible 
movements from the initial state to the subsequent states. On each arrow, the type of the 
movement and its associated likelihood are indicated. For example, the movement from the 
status quo to the unanimous agreement over parking lot is a disloyalty move and likely. 
      (C, {LPH, City}) 
     
     (E, {LPH, City})  
 
 
(B, {LPH, City})    
 
      
(E, {LPH, City, UW}) 
        
      (C, {LPH, City, UW}) 
 
Figure 6.2 – Tree of movements from the initial state to the possible outcomes 
PI - VL 
PI - VL 
DL - VL 
DL - LI 
AG - VL 
SD - VL 
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In our analysis, we assume that a state is feasible if and only if it is a unanimous agreement 
over an alternative. In other words, only those alternatives can be established that are 
supported by all DMs. As illustrated in Figure 6.2, all four types of movements, Preferential 
Improvement, Agglomeration, Disloyalty, and Strategic Disimprovement, may occur in the 
process of negotiations over the redevelopment of Epton site. As depicted in the figure, all of 
these movements are very likely except movement from the status quo to the unanimous 
agreement over alternative C, which is only likely.  
The results indicate that two states could occur as the potential outcome of negotiations: 
unanimous agreement over alternative C and unanimous agreement over alternative E. In 
Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1, the Likelihood Measure was defined as a number indicating, for each 
potential outcome of a negotiation, how likely it is to be the final outcome. To estimate the 
Likelihood Measure for two potential outcomes of this negotiation, we ascribe a subjective 
probability, like 60% and 80%, to each of Likely and Very Likely, respectively. Then 
 
(E, {LPH, City, UW})     (0.8) (0.8) + (0.8) (0.8) + (0.8) = 2.08 
(C, {LPH, City, UW})   0.6 
 
Since the sum of 2.08 and 0.6 is not 1, we normalize them. Table 6.5 shows the resulting 
Likelihood Measures. (Recall that the Likelihood Measure is not a probability.) 
 
Table 6.5: Likelihood Measure for potential outcomes 
potential outcome Likelihood Measure 
(E, {LPH, City, UW}) 0.776 
(C, {LPH, City, UW}) 0.224 
 
 
The analysis shows that we should expect that the unanimous agreement over alternative E 
is much more likely to occur as the ultimate outcome. This happened in reality, when all DMs 
agreed to redevelop the Epton site for having School of Pharmacy. Figure 6.3 shows the actual 




(B,{LPH, City})   (C,{LPH,City})   (E, {LPH,City,UW}) 
   
Figure 6.3 – The actual sequence of movements from the status quo 
 
This sequence of movements matches a path of the tree shown in Figure 6.2. Note from the 
tree that there are two other paths starting from the status quo and ending at the actual outcome 
of negotiations, but these two paths were not followed. 
We now assume that LPH is not indifferent between alternatives A and E. Let us suppose 
that it prefers A to E, so that the revised preferences of this DM over the alternatives would be: 
C A E B D  
Under the new preferences of LPH, the tree of movements shown in Figure 6.2 remains 
without change except for the likelihood of movement from the status quo to the state (E, 
{LPH, City}) which changes to Likely. Also, in the strategic disimprovement from state (C, 
{LPH, City}) to unanimous agreement over the School of Pharmacy, we assume that LPH is 
willing to accept alternative E rather than C. Therefore, the fallback distance of LPH is now 
considered to be at least 2, because LPH must retreat two levels from C to E in this 
disimprovement. The resulting Likelihood Measures would be slightly different due to this 
minor change. Table 6.6 shows the Likelihood Measure for potential outcomes under the new 
preferences of LPH. It indicates that the unanimous agreement over the School of Pharmacy is 
slightly less likely to occur as the ultimate outcome of negotiation if LPH prefers Do Nothing 
to School of Pharmacy. 
 
Table 6.6: Likelihood Measure for potential outcomes under the new preferences of LPH 
potential outcome Likelihood Measure 
(E, {LPH, City, UW}) 0.762 
(C, {LPH, City, UW}) 0.238 
 
 
Preferential Improvement Strategic Disimprovement 
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It is also possible that the University of Waterloo is indifferent between alternatives A and 
D and does not prefer D to A. In other words, we assume new preferences for this DM as 
follows: E B C D A∼ ∼ ∼  
Under the new preferences of the University of Waterloo, nothing changes. Possible moves, 




The remediation and redevelopment of the Epton site has been very challenging, costly and 
time consuming for the DMs. In the end, LP Holding, the City of Kitchener and the University 
of Waterloo unanimously agreed to build a School of Pharmacy after years of negotiations and 
discussions of several alternatives. The multilateral negotiations over the Epton site brownfield 
redevelopment project are modeled and analyzed in this chapter, using the methodology of 
Chapter 3. The results show that the decisions on the use of the property followed the most 
likely path described and predicted by the model. Additionally, some sensitivity analyses over 
the preferences of DMs indicate that possible alternative preference orders would have little or 





















Conclusions and Future Work 
 
7.1 Summary of Contributions 
 
In this thesis, new definitions and a novel methodology for modeling and analyzing of 
multilateral negotiations have been developed and applied to two real-world cases. The 
proposed methodology identifies the most likely outcomes of multilateral negotiations when 
reaching an agreement is the main objective of the DMs. This methodology is mostly 
descriptive. It is specifically designed for convenient application to asymmetric multilateral 
negotiations. Particular contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
• Defining new concepts including State, Acceptability, Feasibility, Stability, and 
Fallback Distance. 
• Formally defining different types of movements from one state to another, including 
preferential improvement, agglomeration, disloyalty move, and strategic 
disimprovement. 
• Investigating the theoretical properties of the different types of movements and proving 
that all four movement types are mutually exclusive.   
• Proposing necessary criteria and developing algorithms to measure the likelihood of 
different types of movements and calculating likelihood measures for predicted 
outcomes. 
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• Illustrating the evolution of negotiations from the status quo to the predicted outcomes 
using a tree structure. 
 
Like other models, the methodology proposed in this thesis has some limitations. So far, 
the following limitations have been investigated: 
• The alternatives discussed in the model are points in a discrete space. Because the set 
of possible agreements is pre-specified, learning is not possible and the outcome of 
negotiation cannot be a combination of the proposed alternatives, so the model is not 
integrative. However, one can combine alternatives in any sensible way and get a new 
model which in turn can be analyzed. 
• The condition defined to determine feasibility of states can handle the situations in 
which veto power is possible, but the assumption that sums of weights measure 
effective power does not take into account possible synergies of players, positive or 
negative. 
 
Like existing models discussed in Chapter 2, the proposed methodology is applied to predict 
the most likely outcomes of the continuing Caspian Sea negotiations. The most challenging 
step in modeling the Caspian Sea negotiations is to estimate the DMs’ weights. To measure 
them quantitatively, eleven criteria considered to be important determinants of countries’ 
capabilities in the Caspian Sea negotiations are discussed, evaluated, and integrated using a 
Multi Criteria Decision Analysis model. The Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method finds 
the most favourable relative importance scores for criteria and uses them to estimates the 
weights. The results of applying the existing models and the proposed methodology to the 
Caspian Sea negotiations include the following: 
 
Social Choice Rules: We applied some common social choice rules including Condorcet 
winner, Borda Score, Plurality Rule, Median Voting Rule, Majoritarian Compromise, and 
Condorcet’s Practical Method to find a “socially optimal” resolution. All of the applied rules 
recommend division of the Caspian Sea based on Soviet maps. Only the plurality rule 
recommends the condominium approach in addition to division based on Soviet maps. 
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Fallback Bargaining Procedures: Unanimity Fallback Bargaining recommends two 
compromise alternatives: division of the sea based on the International Law of the Seas, and 
division of the seabed based on the International Law of the Seas, with condominium status on 
the surface. These two alternatives maximize the minimum satisfaction of all of the DMs. The 
first compromise alternative has a higher mean rank than the second one. Hence, the division 
of the Caspian Sea based on the International Law of the Seas seems most appropriate, but this 
resolution would require some countries to be more flexible about their impasse (walk-away) 
levels. For the case of the Caspian Sea negotiations, the unanimity decision rule should be 
taken into account. In particular, the majority decision rule does not yield a sustainable 
resolution. 
 
Bankruptcy Procedures: We represented the dispute in financial terms and applied three 
well-known bankruptcy procedures, which are fair division methods that apply to monetary 
claims. We recommended an allocation of the Caspian seabed resources across the five 
Caspian states. The constrained equal award rule is socially optimal according to all of the 
applied social choice rules. The Unanimity Fallback Bargaining procedure selects the 
proportional rule. Hence, resource allocation based on this rule maximizes the minimum 
satisfaction across all five states. 
 
The proposed methodology: In Chapter 5, applying the proposed methodology indicates 
that unanimous agreements over the division of the Caspian Sea, either based on the 
International Law of the Seas or based on Soviet maps,  is the most likely outcome that can be 
predicted as the enduring legal status of the Caspian Sea. The sensitivity analysis shows that 
minor changes in input data of the model do lead to slightly different outcomes.  
 
Based on the conceptual model for multilateral negotiations proposed in Chapter 3, a 
practical Negotiation Support System is designed and implemented. This NSS increases the 
speed of calculations, as well as helps us to avoid mistakes in manual calculations. All 
movements from initial states to subsequent states, in addition to their associated likelihoods, 
are clearly illustrated. All stable states are distinguished by a check mark and feasible stable 
states are shown distinctively in red colour and bold. The Negotiation Support System 
 135
explained in Chapter 4 has been implemented in Microsoft Access using Microsoft Visual 
Basic. 
 
The multilateral negotiations over the Epton site redevelopment project are modeled and 
analyzed in Chapter 6, using the proposed methodology. The objective is to ensure that the 
new methodology is flexible enough to model real-world cases, such as negotiations over the 
redevelopment of a brownfield. Moreover, we wanted to test how well the actual outcomes of 
the real world negotiations match the most likely outcomes identified by the methodology. The 
results show that decisions on the use of the property followed the most likely path described 
and predicted by the model. 
We call what is proposed in Chapter 3 a methodology as it is a family of methods, 
including identifying movements from one state to others, illustrating the evolution of 
negotiation from the initial state by a tree, and estimating the likelihood for the predicted 
outcomes of a negotiation. More specifically, the proposed methodology includes some 
algorithms which are formal techniques, like those for determining the likelihood of different 
types of movements. A model is a specific representation of a phenomenon. In this thesis, we 
have two models, a model for the Caspian Sea negotiations, and a model for the Epton site 
redevelopment negotiations.  
This thesis constitutes multidisciplinary research, as it utilizes different branches of 
knowledge including applied mathematics (game theory), computer science and programming, 
international relations, and environmental management. However, negotiation modeling and 
analysis in this thesis has been developed from an overall systems engineering perspective. 
 
 
7.2 Future Research Directions 
Although substantial theoretical advances have been achieved within our new paradigm for 
modeling and analyzing of multilateral negotiations, some critical issues remain open. Some 
promising research opportunities are as follows: 
 
• Investigating more theoretical properties among the defined movements, and their 
associated likelihoods. The new properties can be expressed by relevant theorems. 
 136
• Applying the proposed methodology to more real-world cases including some other 
brownfield redevelopment projects, such as negotiations over the redevelopment of the 
coal tar site located in downtown Kitchener, Ontario, Canada, to predict the ultimate 
use of this site.  
• Applying existing models, such as social choice rules and fallback bargaining 
procedures, to the negotiations over the Epton site redevelopment project. The 
comparison between the outcomes predicted by the existing models and those 
forecasted by the proposed methodology and the actual outcome as the ultimate use of 
the Epton site, can determine the robustness of the proposed methodology compared 
with other existing models. 
• Examining other related aspects of the Caspian Sea negotiations model by developing 
it further or revising it. For example, if we include pipeline development, in addition to 
the legal status of the Caspian Sea, then oil transit countries like Turkey and Georgia, 
and Caspian Sea oil consumers including Western European stakeholders would be 
relevant decision makers and should be taken into account in the investigation.  
• Further applications may cause development of the theoretical framework and suggest 
other types of movements, other rules for deciding stability, and other ways of 
measuring power. 
• Presently, there is a strategic conflict between Iran and United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) over Iran’s nuclear program. Iran has different options which it 
controls, including suspension of its uranium enrichment activities, expansion, or even 
escalation to war. To select its best option, Iran needs to predict the outcome of the 
negotiations which will be held in UNSC following its action. The most likely 
outcomes of these negotiations among the members of UNSC along with the associated 
likelihood measures can be identified, using the proposed methodology. These most 
likely outcomes of negotiations and the associated probability distribution estimated by 











Appendix A  
 
Weights of the Decision Makers  
in the Epton Site Redevelopment Negotiations 
 
As an exercise, we estimate each DM’s weight in the decision making process which is 
important if the threshold of feasibility is something other than consensus. The procedure is 
summarized in Table A1. It is assumed that the following factors are the most important 
determinants of the capability of DMs in negotiations: 
• Authority: Formal ability of a party to influence the decision making process. 
• Motivation: A party’s need to actively participate in the negotiations.  
• Ownership: The owner of a property should have a veto over the redevelopment or the 
future use of the property.  
• Investment: Financial capability of a party to invest in redevelopment. 
 
 
Table A1: Estimation of DMs’ Weights 
DM 




5 4 5 4 
LPH 
 
2 6 10 6 108 8.6 
City of 
Kitchener 
7 9 3 10 126 10 
University of 
Waterloo 




The performance of each DM for each factor is quantified by a utility value between 0 and 
10. The City of Kitchener possesses the highest authority among DMs due to its formal 
responsibilities and systematic connection to other governments. For example, it can complain 
about LPH to MOE if LPH does not appropriately remediate the contaminated Epton site 
(Witmer, 2008). The City of Kitchener has a strong motivation to encourage the School of 
Pharmacy because it will strengthen opportunities for commercial and municipal development. 
New investments in the city lead to more tax revenue. As the last column of Table A1 
indicates, the City of Kitchener is the most capable DM, and the University of Waterloo the 
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